

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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FOI/PA# 1340830-0

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman *zhr*

DATE: January 11, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ah*

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INFORMANT

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

b3  
b7D

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2-25-98 BY *[Signature]*  
 PER OSA, EOI # 368,692

## SYNOPSIS:

On [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] furnished the following information concerning [REDACTED]

b3  
b7D

WFO noted that [REDACTED] was only  
 disclosed by [REDACTED] assurance that information received would be treated confidentially.

Attachment sent 1-11-55

Tickler: Mr. Boardman  
 Mr. Belmont  
 Mr. Branigan  
 Mr. Roach  
 RIS:baw Mr. Schroder

(6) *h81*

67 JAN 17 1955

RECORDED - 10

INDEXED - 10

EX-110

13 JAN 13 1955

66-80750-2482

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-111

[redacted] is the subject of a pending IS - R investigation based on allegations that he is a Marxist. Bureau files contain no derogatory information concerning [redacted]

Information received from [redacted] was analyzed and it was felt that it was the Bureau's responsibility to furnish data to CIA. On 1/4/55, WFO was instructed to recontact [redacted] and inform him we intend to furnish information to CIA withholding his identity as source.

[redacted] reinterviewed [redacted] Advised [redacted] nor did he furnish identity of [redacted]

[redacted] recontacted [redacted] called [redacted] unable to meet informant as planned. [redacted] could or would not furnish [redacted]

WFO noted that [redacted] has periodically furnished information on [redacted] but has not furnished substantial information on a continuing basis.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That the attached letter to CIA setting forth the [redacted] be personally delivered to Allen Dulles, Director, CIA, by the Liaison Section.

3.

2. The information received from [redacted] appears to be purely an administrative matter which CIA should handle and it is believed that no further investigation by the Bureau is warranted. If you approve Mr. Dulles, in the attached letter, will be advised that no further investigation is being conducted into this matter by this Bureau.

Letter given to  
A. Dulles

1/11/55  
PDS

- 2 -

OK  
H

Jan 1-10  
JL

1/11/55

Rep

*DETAILS:*

On [redacted]

[redacted] *advised that*

[redacted] *advised*

*that* [redacted]

b3

b7D

[redacted] *told*

[redacted] *that*

[redacted] *also advised* [redacted] *would show documentary proof*  
*to* [redacted] *that* [redacted]

b3

b7D

[redacted]  
*was only disclosed by the source after repeated interviews and assurance*  
*that information <sup>was</sup> be treated most confidentially* [redacted]

b3

b7D

*Bureau files reflect that* [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] It is alleged [redacted]  
[redacted]

Bureau files contain no derogatory information concerning [redacted]

b3  
b7D

The information received from [redacted] was analyzed and it was felt that it was the Bureau's responsibility to furnish this data to CIA. On 1/4/55 Inspector C.E. Hennrich called the WFO and instructed that [redacted] be reinterviewed, impressed with the seriousness of the allegations, and informed that in connection with our responsibilities, we intended to furnish this information to CIA withholding [redacted] as the source.

b3  
b7D

[redacted] was reinterviewed on [redacted] He stated that [redacted] contacted him on [redacted] but that [redacted] did not have the summary with him nor did he furnish any further information concerning [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] did show [redacted] a letter from [redacted]  
[redacted] It was [redacted] opinion that this letter was coherent and not one written by a mentally unstable person.

b3  
b7D

[redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted]  
[redacted]

The seriousness of [redacted] allegations was reiterated to [redacted] and he was informed of Bureau's responsibility to furnish this information to CIA including the identity of [redacted] said that [redacted] added that he was positive [redacted] has not discussed this matter with anyone else. [redacted] said that, [redacted]  
[redacted]

b3  
b7D

After repeatedly explaining the Bureau's position in this matter, [redacted] relented to the point that CIA not be notified of this information until [redacted]

In any event, he indicated a desire that if this information were furnished that it would be given only to the Director of CIA and that his identity as a source would not be divulged. b3 b7D

In commenting upon [redacted] noted that [redacted]

WFO advised that [redacted] will be recontacted on [redacted] for any additional information he may possess concerning instant matter. WFO recommended that this matter be presented directly to Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, in accordance with the informant's desire and that Mr. Dulles be requested to take all possible measures to protect the source of this information. b3 b7D

~~Defered~~ [redacted] was recontacted [redacted] He advised that [redacted] [redacted] stated he phoned [redacted] and during conversation requested [redacted] According to [redacted] indicated [redacted] and could not or would not provide names. [redacted] stated he referred to the previously mentioned [redacted] stated he would [redacted] added that [redacted] indicated that [redacted]



**B**

**a**

Orig. and copy  
1 - Yellow file copy  
1 - Sect. Tick. (62-80750)  
1 - E. S. Youtz

**BY COURIER SERVICE**

**DATE:** January 13, 1955

**TO:** Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-25-98 BY SP-8/STC  
Rena SA

**Attention:** [redacted]

b3

**FROM:** John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

**SUBJECT:** [redacted]

b3

Reference is made to our letter of December 29, 1954  
which acknowledged receipt of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3

Two monographs prepared by this Bureau may be of  
assistance in [redacted]

b3

These are "Role of the  
Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence," dated February,  
1953, and "Allegiance of the Communist Party, USA, to the  
Soviet Union," dated December, 1954. Copies of each were  
forwarded to the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of  
issue. If any additional material is developed by us on  
this subject, we will forward it to you.

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

EST: Mjh  
(5)

BY COURIER SVC.  
61 JAN 14  
COMM - FBI

*Wes.*

THIS IS A COPY (See attached notes)

RECORDED - 43

62-80750-24

JAN 14 1955  
145

JAN 18 1955

EX-116-43

January 13, 1955

SUBJECT:

b3

NOTE:

b3

*Reviewed by Espionage  
for operational interest to the field and nothing noted.  
CIA requested that*

Tolson\_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman\_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols\_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont\_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin\_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo\_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen\_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm\_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy\_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr\_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd\_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room\_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman\_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy\_\_\_\_\_

AIRTEL

FBI WASH FIELD

DIRECTOR

ALLEGED COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INFORMANT, IS-R. RE WFO AIRTEL DTD. 12/22/54. ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADVISED SAS PAUL H. FIELDS, JR. AND RICHARD E. POTOCKI THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CONTACTED HIM ON [REDACTED] STATED [REDACTED] DID NOT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND FURNISHED NO FURTHER INFO RE [REDACTED]

IN CIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADVISED [REDACTED] DID SHOW HIM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OPINION WAS THAT LETTER SEEMED COHERENT AND LUCID AND NOT ONE WRITTEN BY  
MENTALLY UNSTABLE PERSON. ADVISED [REDACTED] STATED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REFERRED TO IN REFTEL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SERIOUSNESS OF [REDACTED] ALLEGATIONS WAS

REITERATED TO [REDACTED] AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FBI TO FURNISH THE INFORMATION  
TO CIA, INCLUDING [REDACTED] IDENTITY, WAS FULLY EXPLAINED TO HIM. [REDACTED]

STATED THAT [REDACTED] HAD COME TO HIM IN

STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, AND ADDED THAT HE WAS POSITIVE [REDACTED] HAS DISCUSSED  
THE MATTER WITH NO ONE ELSE. [REDACTED]

PHF:KAM  
105-10653  
(6)

-New York (Info) (RM)

- WFO 105-4027

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-27

INDEXED-27


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888

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PAGE TWO

[REDACTED] INDICATED THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES [REDACTED] WOULD FEEL THAT HE COULD NO LONGER VOLUNTARILY FURNISH INFO TO THE FBI AND BE SURE IT WOULD BE TREATED CONFIDENTIALLY. BUREAU'S RESPONSIBILITIES WERE AGAIN EXPLAINED TO [REDACTED] AGREED THAT BUREAU DID HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING INFORMATION HE FURNISHED TO ATTENTION OF PROPER AGENCY OR AUTHORITY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT, AND THAT SUCH ACTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A BETRAYAL OF CONFIDENCE, SINCE HIS IDENTITY AS THE INFORMANT IS NOT TO BE REVEALED.

[REDACTED] STRONGLY REQUESTED THAT NOTIFICATION TO CIA BE DELAYED UNTIL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT

ALL EVENTS, HE INDICATED A DESIRE THAT SUCH INFO BE FURNISHED ONLY TO THE DIRECTOR, OF CIA, AND [REDACTED] IDENTITY NOT DISCLOSED. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO [REDACTED] EVEN IF SUCH DELAY TOOK PLACE [REDACTED] IDENTITY MUST STILL BE FURNISHED CIA. HE WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST FOR DELAY WOULD BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU, BUT NO PROMISE COULD BE MADE IN THIS REGARD. IN REGARD TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO FURNISH SUBSTANTIAL INFO ON A CONTINUING BASIS [REDACTED] WILL BE RECONTACTED

[REDACTED] FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFO HE MAY POSSESS RE INSTANT MATTER AND THE BUREAU IMMEDIATELY ADVISED. WFO RECOMMENDS THAT THIS MATTER BE PRESENTED DIRECTLY TO MR. ALLAN DULLES, DIRECTOR, CIA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INFORMANT'S DESIRE AND

b3  
b7D

PAGE THREE

THAT MR. DULLES BE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL FEASIBLE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE  
SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION.

LAUGHLIN

AIRTEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tic: Board  
Belmont  
Branigan  
Roach  
Schroder

January 17, 1955

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
VIA LIAISON

RECORDED-21

62-80750-2484  
Mr. Allen W. Dulles (officials)  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Administration Building  
Room 123  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

DECLASSIFIED BY *[signature]*  
ON 2-25-98  
EWOBA

An individual, who has requested his identity be kept confidential, advised that he is well acquainted with [redacted]

[redacted] told our source that [redacted]

[redacted] told our source that [redacted]

[redacted] in strictest confidence [redacted] told our source that [redacted]

[redacted] said that he would show the informant documentary proof that [redacted] however, our source to date has not seen such evidence.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RIS:plv  
(7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 21 1955

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
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b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

January 11, 1955

[redacted] did exhibit [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] our  
source did not have the opportunity to memorize the contents  
of [redacted] but does recall seeing the name [redacted]  
[redacted] The informant added that  
[redacted]

b3  
b7D

During a meeting with our source [redacted]  
exhibited [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] seemed  
coherent and did not appear to be written by a mentally  
unstable person.

In addition [redacted] told our source that  
[redacted]

Our source was most reluctant to furnish us the  
identity of [redacted] He is  
of the opinion that [redacted] has not told anyone else  
about the afore-mentioned matters and that, if questioned,  
[redacted] would readily know where the information emanated.  
It is requested that if you desire to take any action  
concerning this matter that you not divulge this Bureau  
as the source of this information.

b3  
b7D

- 2 -  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

January 11, 1955

The files of this Bureau indicate that [redacted] mentioned above, is the subject of a pending security investigation. Reports in this matter have been furnished to you.

Our files contain no derogatory information concerning [redacted]

b3  
b7D

The above data is being furnished to you for your confidential information and no further inquiries are being conducted into this matter by this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

- 3 -  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## Reds Kill U.S. 'Spy,' Seize Second 'Chutist, They Claim

By the Associated Press

MOSCOW, Jan. 15.—The Soviet government announced last night its border forces had shot dead one resisting "American spy" and captured another after they had been parachuted into Soviet Estonia last summer.

The State Security Committee of the USSR named the two men as Kalja Kuk and Hans Toomla, without further identification. The captured man has been turned over to a military tribunal for trial.

The committee said the two men fought in the German army during World War II and then escaped to Sweden from where they were taken to the United States to be trained as spies.

It said one received his espionage instruction at a town about 30 miles northwest of Washington, D. C., the name of which translates into English as Pools-ville. (The Postal Guide lists a Poolesville, Md.)

### Fairfax Named.

The other, the announcement said, was trained at a spy school about 4 miles outside Fairfax, Va.

It said they were sent from the United States to a spy school at a town called Starnben, Germany (probably Starnberg, near Munich), where they learned sharpshooting, radio communications, writing with invisible ink, forging of documents and parachute jumping.

The committee said the men were flown from Munich to a point over Soviet Estonia where they were dropped into Soviet territory.

Their mission was to collect information on Soviet airfields and other military objectives, to select places on Estonian soil suitable for dropping other United States spies, to copy Soviet documents and to recruit new agents for the United States intelligence.

### Sent Reports by Radio.

The committee said the men were supposed to transmit their information by radio and also through the mail by using invisible ink.

For this purpose, it said, they were supposed to communicate with Werner Dorman, 26 North St. Louis avenue, Chicago, 47, Ill., or with Arthur Kruttman, 2520 North St. Louis avenue, Chicago.

It said that their instructions were that when they had finished their task to proceed northward through the Soviet Union and cross the frontier into Norway, where they would be met by a representative of United States intelligence.

In Chicago, neither a Werner Dorman nor an Arthur Kruttman is listed in the telephone directory. Persons bearing such names were not at the addresses given.

However, a Werner Dorman was located on the South Side. He said he never heard of the two men named by the Russians, as spies and had no idea of what it was all about.

Mr. Dorman, 52, said he knew of no other Werner Dorman and that he had never heard of an Arthur Kruttman.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3-30-98 BY SP2 ALM/EHL  
Per 06A

EVE. STAR  
1/15/55

memo  
Loach to  
Belmont  
1-18-55  
SEP/lt

ENC

62-80750-2485

100-3-94

January 12, 1955

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

VOA LIAISON

b3

Attention: [REDACTED]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INFORMATION CONCERNING EIGHT INDIVIDUALS  
ALLEGEDLY CONNECTED WITH CIA

This is to confirm information furnished via  
liaison channels on December 22, 1954, January 4, and  
January 6, 1955, to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] of your Agency.

b3

On December 13, 1954, a confidential and  
reliable source advised that the following names and  
addresses were listed on a document in the possession  
of a key figure in the Communist Party, USA. With the  
exception of the names of [REDACTED] there  
appeared after each name, the notation "CIA." In  
connection with the name of [REDACTED] the notation appeared  
"CIA or FBI."

b3  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] CIA

[REDACTED] CIA

[REDACTED] CIA

[REDACTED] CIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CIA

CIA or FBI

[REDACTED] CIA

[REDACTED]

SJP:HOB:lad

(6)

SECRET 7 1955

Please see page 3

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

2  
The files of the FBI fail to reflect that [redacted] was ever connected, in any way, with the FBI. Since there was no city address listed for [redacted] the telephone directories in the New York area were checked. It was observed that a [redacted] resides at [redacted]

On December 22, 1954, you furnished the results of a preliminary check of your files regarding the above-described individuals. Based upon information furnished by you, the FBI records have been reviewed with the following results: b3

[redacted]

The FBI files reveal that an individual with the same name filed an application for the position of Special Agent with the FBI on May 27, 1941. He was never employed by the FBI. Other references in our files indicated that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The files of the FBI reveal that in November, 1951, [redacted]


[redacted]

[redacted]

You advised that [redacted] Information received from a confidential informant in July, 1950, reflected that the [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~




b3



b3

Referral/Consult

You advised that



The FBI has no information indicating why this list of names was in the possession of this key Communist or to what purpose this document, bearing these names, was to be used. You may be assured that if we obtain any pertinent information in this connection, you will be advised promptly. Since you have been furnished with all pertinent information in our files in this connection, no further action is being taken by us concerning the individuals mentioned above. In accordance with the request made by you via liaison channels, the FBI is not taking any action under the provisions of Executive Order 10450 unless a request is received from you.

It will be appreciated if you will furnish the FBI all pertinent background information in your files concerning the individuals mentioned above. The FBI also desires to receive any pertinent information which you may develop through your inquiries within the CIA concerning the instant matter. In this connection, we are particularly interested in being advised of any information you develop as to why these names appeared on a list in the possession of a key Communist.

NOTE ON YELLOW: The Director in a memorandum dated December 27, 1954, approved the recommendation that CIA be advised that the names described were listed on a document in the possession of a key figure in the Communist Party, USA. (The key figure in the Communist Party referred to herein is Ralph Glick who is operating as a Communist underground functionary.)

~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ABM*

DATE:

January 18, 1955 *W*FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *RR*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) SURVEY BY  
THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
SURVEY OF CIA, BY GENERAL MARK W. CLARK

Tolson ☒  
 Boardman ☒  
 Nichols ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Harbo ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Parsons ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Tamm ☒  
 Sizoo ☒  
 Winterrowd ☒  
 Tele. Room ☒  
 Holloman ☒  
 Gandy ☒

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-31-98 BY SP2 ALM/ELH

Reference is made to the attached article which appeared in the January 15, 1955, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" reflecting that Senator McCarthy had furnished to General Mark Clark information concerning "Communism" in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In my memorandum of January 5, 1955, I reported that General Clark's group had been endeavoring to obtain from Senator McCarthy the information he allegedly possessed concerning security risks in CIA. The article indicates that General Clark and Senator McCarthy have finally gotten together on the matter.

On January 17, 1955, [redacted] CIA, advised Agent Papich that so far CIA has not received the identities of individuals whom Senator McCarthy considered to be security risks. [redacted] further added that General Clark's group has not informed the CIA concerning the nature of the information allegedly passed on by Senator McCarthy. According to [redacted] Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, transmitted a telegram to General Clark on Saturday, January 15, 1955, requesting General Clark to expedite the transmittal of any names furnished by Senator McCarthy so that any necessary investigative action could be taken immediately.

EXCL., On January 17, 1955, [redacted] CIA, volunteered the same information as given by [redacted] and added that he personally felt that CIA "was in good shape." He stated that he was quite certain that in the past year the Agency had done a good job in removing security risks and he did not feel Senator McCarthy furnished information to General Clark not already known to the CIA. [redacted] stated that Senator McCarthy had received information [redacted]

He advised that CIA long ago had conducted all the necessary investigation pertaining to these allegations. 15-22

Attachment (1)

SJP:fjb

(4)

RECORDED-74

INDEXED-74

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Section Chief

1 - Mr. Papich

62-80750-2486

JAN 21 1955

58 JAN 27 1955

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

In my memorandum of January 5, 1955, I advised that General James George Christiansen, Head of General Mark Clark's Working Committee, had advised Agent Papich that he expected to submit some name check requests to the Bureau. At that time General Christiansen indicated that the requests would pertain to individuals in CIA who had questionable security backgrounds. So far, no requests have been submitted by General Christiansen.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

AB

JB

AB

# McCarthy Reports Giving Clark Data on 'Communism' in CIA

By James Y. Newton

Senator McCarthy said today that he had met with Gen. Mark Clark and "turned over some information to him on alleged communism and corruption" in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Gen. Clark was named chairman of a commission by President Eisenhower several months ago to investigate the CIA, mainly on an organizational basis. Senator McCarthy said the two talked for nearly an hour yesterday.

"I gave him some names and some leads that we have," the Wisconsin Republican said. "I told him I would give him whatever I have available. I told him as we go through the files I will turn over anything we come across on the CIA."

Senator McCarthy, as chairman of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee, launched an abortive investigation last year of what he called communism in the CIA, the Government's secret intelligence agency.

## Data From Own Files.

The Wisconsin Republican said that the information he discussed with Gen. Clark came from his personal files, although he thought there was data on the CIA also in the subcommittee files, which are now under control of the Democrats.

The former subcommittee chairman said that "some confidential informants" would be contacted by him to obtain their authorization so he could give their names and additional information to Gen. Clark.

Senator Mansfield, Democrat, of Montana has proposed that Congress set up a joint committee as a "sort of watchdog" over the CIA.

Senator McCarthy said that "some committee certainly should look into the CIA" and that he had no objection to Senator Mansfield's idea. He said that the difficulty under which Gen. Clark worked was that he lacked the power to subpoena witnesses.

## "Mail Cover" Probe.

During the recent McCarthy censure debate the Senate appointed two of its members, former Senator Ferguson, Republican, of Michigan and Senator George, Democrat, of Georgia, to look into Senator McCarthy's charge that a "mail cover" was placed on his correspondence and that of some of his aides by a Senate elections subcommittee that had investigated him three years ago. The two Senators suggested that the case to be referred to the Justice Department.

Senator McCarthy said that the "mail cover" case should be sent to the Justice Department and the into a grand jury and he would move that it be done.

The Wisconsin Republican, appearing in good health for the first time in several months, announced that he would make three speeches in the next month. He will speak on January 22 to the Army and Navy Club in Newark, N. J., February 11 at a Lincoln Day rally in Appleton, Wis., February 12 to a Republican seminar in Chicago.

WASH. EVE STAR

1/15/55

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-31-98 BY SP2 ACH/EHL

Per DGA

62-80750-2486

ENCLOSURE

*mems Ransh  
to Belmont  
1-18-55  
JEP/800*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *WPK*

DATE:

January 18, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R.R.*SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

*Viper*

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

*Cap*  
*Roach*

SYNOPSIS:

On January 14, 1955, Senator Mansfield (D-Mont.) submitted a resolution for the creation of a joint Congressional committee designed to make "continued studies of the activities of the CIA." Senator Mansfield submitted similar resolution in March, 1954, and the legislation was not passed in last session of Congress. The proposed resolution raises two questions which merit the attention of the Bureau. One is an interpretation that a joint Congressional committee could study the Bureau's operations in the intelligence field. The other refers to the possibility that the Bureau's facilities and personnel could be utilized by the Congressional committee in a study of CIA operations. These interpretations were directed to the attention of the Attorney General by memorandum dated March 23, 1954. The Attorney General was informed that the Director did not believe that the Bureau should become involved in investigations or inquiries pertaining to the administration of another agency unless the facts warranted an investigation which clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3-31-98 BY SP2ALH/ELH  
Per 06A

ENCLOSURE

SJP:fjb  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Section tickler

RECORDED - 33

INDEXED - 33

EX-103

JAN 24 1955

15 31 6H 22

1 - Mr. Nichols  
1 - Mr. Papovich

58 JAN 31 1955



Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

DETAILS:

On January 14, 1955, Senator Mansfield (D-Mont.) submitted a concurrent resolution in the Senate to establish a joint committee for the purpose of making "continued studies of the activities of the CIA." There is attached hereto the report of this matter as set forth in the "Congressional Record," Pages 283 and 284, January 14, 1955.

For your information, Senator Mansfield introduced a similar resolution in the Senate on March 10, 1954. His proposed legislation did not pass the committee stage in the last session of Congress. The resolution submitted in March, 1954, was analyzed and memoranda were submitted to you dated March 15, 18 and 24, 1954. A memorandum dated March 23, 1954, regarding the resolution was submitted to the Attorney General.

The present resolution submitted by Senator Mansfield appears to be almost an exact duplicate of the legislation proposed in March, 1954, with the exception of the make-up of the committee. The earlier resolution called for five members from the Senate and five from the House. The latest legislation proposes six members from each.

In his address before the Senate, Senator Mansfield reiterated the following points which were also emphasized by him last year:

1. "It is imperative that a joint congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security."

2. Senator Mansfield does not question the need for CIA but he is concerned that the Agency is responsible to no one but the National Security Council. He is critical of the fact that CIA is free from every ordinary form of Congressional check. He maintains that there is a profound difference between "an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy."

3. The proposed committee would be authorized to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, take testimony, review bills

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

or resolutions pertaining to CIA, see that good management is maintained by CIA, and keep a constant check on its intelligence policies.

4. The Senator recommends that vigorous steps be taken to improve the CIA and its work. He emphasizes that the purpose of the committee would be in a sense to safeguard as well as to supervise the policies of CIA.

5. The proposed committee is authorized "to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government."

Two of the items described above merit the attention of the Bureau, namely items No. 1 and No. 5. These two points were called to your attention in March, 1954, and were specifically highlighted in the Bureau's memorandum to the Attorney General dated March 23, 1954. It was pointed out to the Attorney General that one interpretation of Senator Mansfield's phraseology was that the proposed committee could initiate studies of the handling of intelligence by agencies such as the Bureau. With regard to the utilization of "services, information, etc.," of departments and establishments of the Government, the Attorney General was informed that a question arose as to whether the FBI would be used by the Congressional committee to conduct a study of the CIA. The Attorney General was advised that the Director did not believe that the Bureau should become involved in studies, investigations or inquiries pertaining to the administration of another agency unless the facts warranted an investigation which clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

For your information, Senator Mansfield's resolution has upset CIA officials who in the past have been subjected to adverse publicity and to probes by General James Doolittle last summer and currently by General Mark Clark. In my memorandum of March 24, 1954, I reported that Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, had indicated that he had obtained the support of certain Senators in opposing the proposed legislation. Dulles also indicated that he had the support of President Eisenhower and he was confident that any bill designed to create a joint committee on central intelligence would be defeated in Congress.

On January 17, 1955, [redacted]

[redacted] CIA, advised Agent Papich that a joint committee on

b3

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

central intelligence would be detrimental to the best interests of the country. He stated that if one could be assured that a committee and its staff personnel would protect security attached to CIA operations and would refrain from using CIA information for political purposes, a joint committee could be of definite value. [ ] stated that it was most doubtful that anyone could rely on such assurance and he is confident that if a joint committee is created the CIA eventually would become a political football. [ ] also emphasized that the resolution proposed by Senator Mansfield introduces legislation which would grant a Congressional committee powers of an unconstitutional character in that Congress would be in a position to dictate on policy which has constitutionally been delegated to the Executive. b3

[ ] advised that CIA feels that Senator Mansfield is honestly endeavoring to do something constructive; that the CIA regards the Senator as a friend, but that it is believed that Senator Mansfield is not fully cognizant of all of the problems involved in running an intelligence organization.

Jm

mitted on Agriculture and Roads, and ordered to be printed in the Record. [The joint resolution will appear hereafter in the Record.]

#### JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that it is imperative that a joint congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security. I feel that there should be a joint congressional committee authorized and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities.

The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I certainly am not challenging it now. What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without direct control of the legislatures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain, where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

There has been almost no congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. It is conceivable that as the need for an intelligence service had been evident in 1946, the Congressional Reorganization Act of that year would have made provisions for congressional participation in the committee structure of Congress. As it is now, however, CIA is freed from practically every ordinary form of congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies. Each year only a handful of Members in each House see the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this Agency other than a briefing which is supplied to a few Members of selected subcommittees.

I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. Secrecy for these purposes is obviously necessary.

However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake, we will have no way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.

If a new committee is set up as proposed in this legislation, all bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of Representatives relating primarily to the CIA, would be referred to the joint committee; and the joint committee would, from time to time, make whatever reports are necessary to the Congress concerning its relationship with the CIA.

This resolution would establish a joint committee composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance, not more than 4 Members shall be of the same political party.

The joint committee or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof would be authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The committee is, in addition, empowered to appoint its staff and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Mr. President, in my opinion, the CIA is in somewhat the same category as the Atomic Energy Commission, and just as a special committee, with well defined authority and powers, has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of the AEC, so I believe should a joint congressional committee be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA. I realize full well, because of the very nature of the duties of the CIA, there there has been no public scrutiny of its activities. This may be necessary in this day and age, but I do believe that a joint congressional committee should be created for the purpose of seeing that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well, too, that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make.

Until a committee of the kind I am proposing is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded. In 1949, the Hoover Commission examined the CIA. A task force stated that—

The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability in its estimates. With-

services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate; such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3-31-98 BY SP2 ADH/EHL  
Per OGA

62-80750-2487

ENCLOSURE

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 1-17-55

FROM : H. L. Edwards *HLE*

SUBJECT:  b3

*Handwritten list of names:*  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
 Sizoo  
 Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

On January 12, 1955, I was confidentially advised by

that

exhibited to me   
 which confirmed

My meeting with  was in connection with previously approved action of the Director to try to find out

and the information I secured on that matter is being made the subject of a separate memorandum.

In the course of my interview with  I asked him

stated that

stated that

From a strictly confidential but reliable source, I was informed that

HLE:MAH  
(3)  
CC: Mr. Bannon

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3-31-98 BY SP2 ALM/LEH  
Per OGA

INDEXED-74

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

33 JAN 28 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-18043

62-80750-2488  
JAN 24 1955  
3/ fine

The source of mu information did not have [redacted]

The source also was not able to advise me [redacted]

However, this contact is going to try to obtain further information for me in this regard. b3

This is submitted for your information as a matter of possible interest [redacted] It is not definitely known whether [redacted] b3

JPM

1/18/55

✓

✓

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *APB*DATE: January 19, 1955 *AB*FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *Q*SUBJECT: *0* *(y)* *V*  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
SURVEY OF CIA BY GENERAL MARK W. CLARK

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SYNOPSIS:

On January 18, 1955, General James George Christiansen, Head of General Mark Clark's Working Committee, advised that he would begin submitting name check requests within a few days. These checks would pertain to CIA employees who have questionable security backgrounds. General Christiansen inquired regarding form in which Bureau would submit data. He was told this would be handled by making available copies of reports or by memoranda. He also inquired if Bureau could conduct investigations for Clark committee. He was told that as it stands Bureau has no authority to conduct investigations of employees of another agency for Clark committee. His attention was directed to Bureau responsibilities under provisions of Executive Order 10450 in the event Clark committee receives derogatory information concerning a Government employee. General Christiansen then discarded any further consideration for investigations by Bureau. General Christiansen also inquired if Bureau could afford a briefing to him and three of his colleagues concerning United States counterintelligence. He is interested in Bureau's conception of counterintelligence, how Bureau is carrying out its counterintelligence responsibilities, problems or gaps in the field, and solutions or recommendations for such problems.

ACTION:

If you approve, the Liaison Section will handle the name check requests to be submitted by the Clark committee. General Christiansen will be advised by Liaison Agent Papich that the Bureau desires that the committee return all correspondence and documents after the committee has completed its survey, which is scheduled to terminate in March, 1955. It will again be reiterated to General Christiansen that under no circumstances should any of the Bureau data be made available or furnished to any individuals or agencies outside of that committee.

RECORDED-35

SJP:fjb  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Section tickler

1 - Mr. Belmont  
EX-116 Mr. Papich

13 FEB 1 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 4-21-98 BY SP-2 Bulew  
R-06A

name  
from  
Belmont  
1-24-55  
AG-4 DAG  
1-25-55  
SJP/hh

OK  
d.

62-80150-2489



Memo to Mr. Boardman  
from Mr. Belmont

With regard to the request for a briefing concerning counterintelligence, I will be prepared to brief General Christiansen and his colleagues at 10:00 A.M., Friday, January 28, 1955. This date will be confirmed with General Christiansen via liaison channels. A memorandum covering my proposed briefing is being prepared in this Division and will be submitted to you for your approval prior to the briefing.

*I suggest memo.  
to all and Rogers  
on this*

*1/21*

*for  
new.*

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memoranda of January 5 and 18, 1955, concerning the captioned matter. In my memorandum of January 5, 1955, I reported that General James George Christiansen, Head of General Mark Clark's Working Committee, advised that he planned to submit name check requests to the Bureau. He indicated that the checks would pertain to individuals in CIA who had questionable security backgrounds. The Director's comment concerning these name check requests noted in the afore-mentioned memorandum was "If received, give top priority. H."

On January 18, 1955, General Christiansen inquired of Agent Papich regarding the form in which information would be submitted to the Clark group when name checks were made to the Bureau. He was informed by Agent Papich that the Bureau would make available copies of reports or would reflect the results of the Bureau's file review in the form of a memorandum. Agent Papich also made it clear to General Christiansen that any information furnished to the Clark committee would be given with



Memo to Mr. Boardman  
from Mr. Belmont

the understanding that the data under no circumstances be disseminated outside of the Clark committee. General Christiansen then inquired if the Bureau would be in a position to conduct investigations for the Clark committee. He elaborated by stating that such investigations would pertain to individuals who had questionable security backgrounds. General Christiansen was referring to investigations of individuals in other agencies and he undoubtedly had CIA in mind. He was informed by Agent Papich that as it stands there is no authority for the Bureau to conduct investigations for the Clark committee on individuals employed by other agencies. It was further pointed out to General Christiansen that in the event the Clark committee received derogatory information concerning a Government employee the Bureau would like to receive such data in order to handle the matter under the provisions of Executive Order 10450. General Christiansen was also told that in the event such information came to the attention of the Clark group the Bureau would like to have the identity of the original source in order to facilitate a complete and accurate investigation.

After listening to the Liaison Agent, General Christiansen then commented that he could now see that the Clark committee was not in a position to request the Bureau to conduct investigations concerning employees of other agencies unless some new special procedure was duly authorized. He then stated that he was not making any such requests but that he would begin submitting name check requests in the next few days.

With regard to the handling of name check requests for the Clark committee, it should be noted that the Bureau has been handling such requests for the Hoover Commission. General Clark's group is a part of the Hoover Commission. For your information, the Attorney General ruled that the Hoover Commission was not a part of the Executive Branch of the Government. However, it was approved that the Bureau conduct name checks for the Hoover Commission. (Memorandum Boardman to the Director, July 6, 1954, "Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, aka., Hoover Commission"; 62-88575-18)

The Clark committee is scheduled to complete its survey of the CIA in March, 1955. Agent Papich asked General Christiansen what disposition would be made of Bureau correspondence or reports which would be transmitted to the Clark group. Christiansen stated that after the Clark committee terminated its work, the Bureau's material would be referred to the custody of

Memo to Mr. Boardman  
from Mr. Belmont

the Hoover Commission. General Christiansen stated that he would be very glad to return all of the Bureau's material after the committee completed its work in order that the Bureau could retain complete control of the documents. Such a procedure appears to make sense in order to protect the Bureau's position in the event any information concerning CIA employees leaked from the Clark committee. For the Bureau to retain the information given to the Clark committee appears to be a protective measure particularly since the Hoover Commission has been ruled as not being a part of the Executive Branch of the Government.

Following the discussion of the foregoing matter, General Christiansen then inquired if it would be possible for the Bureau to afford a briefing to him and three of his colleagues, Colonel John J. Dubbelde, Captain Henry Richter and Oliver Lloyd Onion, concerning counterintelligence. A review of Bureau files has failed to disclose any derogatory information concerning the foregoing individuals. He stated that a similar briefing was being given to the Clark group by each U. S. intelligence agency. When questioned regarding the desired scope of such a briefing, General Christiansen stated that he was particularly interested in the following:

1. What is the Bureau's conception of what over-all United States counterintelligence should be?
2. Where does the Bureau fit into U.S. counterintelligence efforts and how is it discharging its responsibilities?
3. Are there any problems or gaps in U.S. counterintelligence?
4. If there are, what are the solutions or recommendations for improvement?

General Christiansen stated that he would expect the Bureau only to hit the high points in this matter. He added that his group is endeavoring to look at the entire field of U.S. counterintelligence in a very objective manner and if there was a need for any kind of improvement, the Clark committee desired to make the appropriate recommendations.

You may be interested to know that

b3

Referral/Consult

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Orig & dupl - AG
- 1 - AG Rogers
- 1 - yellow
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-35  
INDEXED-35

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

January 25, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

SURVEY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) is currently conducting a survey of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This survey is being handled by a task force under the supervision of General Mark Clark. On January 10, 1955, General James George Christiansen, head of the working committee for the task force, advised that he would begin submitting name check requests to the Bureau. He indicated that the requests would pertain to CIA employees who allegedly had questionable security backgrounds. On January 21, 1955, he furnished the Bureau a list of names and requested that these names be checked against the Bureau's records. He confidentially advised that the names were furnished to General Mark Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy. General Christiansen stated that he had been given only the names by General Clark and that he personally did not know if Senator McCarthy had furnished any additional information concerning the individuals listed. General Christiansen was informed by a representative of the Bureau that the task force should bear in mind that in the event any information of a derogatory nature was received concerning a Government employee the Bureau wished to be advised because of our responsibilities under the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

With regard to the handling of name check requests for the Hoover Commission, you will recall that in accordance with your request the Bureau began handling name checks concerning personnel of the Hoover Commission in October, 1953. With your approval, the Bureau has also conducted some full-field loyalty investigations of personnel in the Hoover Commission. In view of this background, the Bureau has agreed to handle the name check requests submitted by General Christiansen. (140-1397-13, 25, 30)

General Christiansen was advised by a Bureau representative that the name check requests would receive prompt attention; that the Bureau would make available reports covering

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Harbo
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Sizoo
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

SJP:fjb  
(8) Belmont to Boardman  
Cover memo/1-24-55, "Survey of CIA by the Commission on Organization of the Exec Branch of the Govt; by Gen Clark" - SJP:fjb

51 FEB 1955

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 NEW/ELH  
ON 4-1-98  
Per OGA

AN 26 10 27 AM '55  
RECEIVED RECORDS ROOM

any investigation conducted or would furnish memoranda covering the results of the file reviews; that such documents should be returned to the Bureau when the task force completed its survey; that under no circumstances should any of the Bureau information furnished be made available to any individuals or agencies outside of the task force; and that in the event the task force contemplated using any of the Bureau information in any discussion with another agency the task force will first confer with the Bureau. General Christiansen agreed to all of the foregoing.

It was emphasized to General Christiansen that the FBI desired to cooperate with the Hoover Commission, but we definitely did not wish to be left in a position of being accused of sniping at other agencies. I feel that it is important that the FBI offer all reasonable assistance to the group handling the survey of the CIA, but that such assistance be rendered in such a manner as to protect the security of our information and to preserve our good working relations with other agencies.

You may be interested to know that on January 18, 1955, General Christiansen inquired if the FBI could conduct any investigations for the task force. He indicated that the investigations would pertain to employees of the CIA who had questionable security backgrounds. He was informed that the FBI had no authority to conduct such investigations for the task force. Our responsibilities concerning the security of Government employees were explained to him and he then stated that he was discarding any intention to request that investigations be conducted by the Bureau.

On January 18, 1955, General Christiansen also inquired if the Bureau could afford a briefing to him and three of his task force colleagues on the subject of U. S. counterintelligence. Assistant Director A. H. Belmont will brief General Christiansen and his colleagues on January 28, 1955.

The above is being furnished for your information.

1 - Mr. William P. Rogers  
Deputy Attorney General

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE:

January 25, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURER

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SYNOPSIS: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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has inquired if the Bureau would give consideration to Bureau representative lecturing before CIA intelligence officers; lecture to be a part of CIA training program. [redacted] claims that CIA personnel, including some officials, are sadly misinformed or ignorant of Bureau's responsibilities, jurisdiction and objectives. Advantages and disadvantages to Bureau, if lecture is given, analyzed.

RECOMMENDATION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

It is recommended that a Bureau representative lecture before CIA intelligence officers. It is believed that in face of the inquiry made by CIA the Bureau's leading position and reputation in the intelligence field would be further enhanced by a lecture on the Bureau's jurisdiction, responsibilities and general objectives in the internal security field. Such a lecture would constitute a positive and aggressive approach toward maintaining our prestige in the intelligence field. In this connection it should be borne in mind that among the CIA listeners there will be many potential friends and supporters of the Bureau. If you approve, Supervisor L. Whitson will handle the lecture as he is completely familiar with counter-espionage as it relates to the Bureau's work; is a good speaker, and a well matured Agent. The lectures will be limited to three per year. Liaison Agent Papich will be present when the lecture is given. In his lecture, Mr. Whitson will concentrate on the subject of the Bureau's jurisdiction and its responsibilities in the intelligence field. He will not divulge information of a confidential nature concerning our operations.

SJP:fjb  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Section tickler

- 1 - Mr. Branigan  
1 - Mr. Papich

66 FEB 7 1955

RECORDED-45  
INDEXED-45

13 FEB 8 1955

EX-100

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 CJC/AM  
ON 9/19/94 C.A. 782-1816  
CIA INFO. IS UNCLASSIFIED  
PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/19/94

100-2493  
H.A. 100-2493

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
REQUEST FOR A BUREAU LECTURER

DETAILS:

[redacted]  
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has inquired if the Bureau would give consideration to a Bureau representative lecturing before CIA intelligence officers concerning the Bureau's responsibilities, jurisdiction and general objectives in the field of internal security. [redacted] would like to have the lecture given periodically to a group of 40 to 50 intelligence officers as a part of their training in the field of counter-espionage. [redacted] has admitted that he personally was ignorant of many of the Bureau's functions and general objectives until he became personally involved in many matters of mutual interest between the CIA and the Bureau. He is convinced that the majority of CIA intelligence officers at headquarters and in the field, including many top officials, are sadly misinformed or ignorant of the Bureau's objectives in the internal security field. He admits that his own Agency is basically at fault for the existence of such a situation. He stated that he would like to make an attempt to correct the situation.

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The Bureau has never before given any lectures to CIA personnel on the subject of internal security. The Bureau has provided lecturers for ONI, OSI, AEC, G-2 and the Department of State. To initiate such lectures before CIA would be something definitely very new and different. [redacted] is obviously first thinking of the welfare of his own Agency and there is no doubt that he fully appreciates the fact that personnel of the CIA could derive benefit from a Bureau lecture. So much for CIA, it is believed that [redacted] inquiry does raise a question as to what advantages could be accrued by the Bureau in the event a lecture was afforded to CIA personnel. There are being set forth for your information the advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages

Dispelling the attitude which still exists among CIA personnel that the Bureau is merely a law enforcement agency; that it is uncooperative.

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
REQUEST FOR A BUREAU LECTURER

~~SECRET~~

Largely because of an influence carried over from old OSS days, there has existed an attitude among many CIA employees, including some officials; that the FBI is basically a law enforcement agency and that it is out of its field when it gets involved in intelligence operations, i.e., development of defectors, double agents, penetration of foreign intelligence services, etc. The same element that has been critical of the Bureau's ability in the intelligence field has also been inclined to characterize the Bureau as being uncooperative in dealings with the CIA. As stated above, this attitude largely stems from old OSS officers who moved into CIA and who have influenced newcomers in the Agency.

\*It is believed that a Bureau representative could do much in orienting CIA intelligence officers by clarifying that we have the ability, know-how, record and experience to ably qualify the Bureau for the handling of problems and acceptance of challenges in the intelligence field regardless of complexities involved.

The Bureau can win new supporters and friends.

Through a well-organized lecture, effectively presented, the Bureau will be in a position to win new friends and contacts within the CIA, particularly within the younger element. Such friends can always be of assistance in that they can become more appreciative and alert for Bureau interests. It should be borne in mind that regardless of what happens to CIA as an organization, many of the people connected with that Agency, particularly the younger employees, are sincerely and wholeheartedly interested in making foreign intelligence a career. Their respect and support for the Bureau in future years could be of value.

The potentialities of receiving information of value could be increased.

It can be readily accepted that the task confronted by the Bureau in covering Soviet and satellite espionage operations in this country is one requiring tireless efforts to explore every reasonable source of information which may identify a Soviet agent, lead to the development of a double agent or defector, or uncover any new Soviet espionage or sabotage techniques.

[redacted] CIA's accomplishments as a supplier of such data to the Bureau have not been

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b7E

~~SECRET~~



Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
REQUEST FOR A BUREAU LECTURER

~~SECRET~~

satisfactory. Whether the Agency will improve in this regard is a matter of conjecture but there does not seem to be anything lost in using a lecturer to show CIA personnel what we have been lacking and what we would like to have.

The Bureau could receive benefit by stressing to CIA that incomplete and inaccurate coverage results in waste of time and manpower.

Too often the CIA transmits communications which contain incomplete data, vague allegations or reflect an absolute ignorance of Bureau jurisdiction. As a result, it becomes necessary for the Bureau to initiate correspondence in an attempt to get more facts. This quite often develops into a prolonged situation and frequently ends with CIA either not developing any more data or modifying its original report. Sometimes the Bureau becomes engaged in running down leads which could have been eliminated if CIA personnel in the field had been properly oriented. To some extent, conditions have improved, but a periodic presentation of the Bureau's position before CIA intelligence officers could stimulate a healthy outlook for our interests. On the occasion of the lecture, the Bureau representative could cite several concrete examples where incomplete reporting and ignorance of the Bureau's objectives resulted in an actual loss to the Government. All of this can be handled in a flexible enough manner free of provoking any antagonism.

Our knowledge of CIA operations will be enlarged.

The reputation of the CIA as being a "hush-hush" and "cloak and dagger" agency has frequently been the source of ridicule and joking comments and all with good reason. Worst of all, the frequently exaggerated secrecy attached to some of the Agency's activities has not only confused its own employees but has created numerous obstructions to the Bureau's successful execution of its responsibilities. In this connection, quite often we have been handicapped because we have never been confident that CIA was furnishing all of the facts on a particular matter.

There does not seem to be much evidence of any substantial change in this cloak and dagger atmosphere in CIA, which continues to exist. [The Bureau nevertheless is in a position where it is dealing with the largest intelligence organization in the world next to the Soviets. If the Bureau

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Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

~~SECRET~~  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURER

is to carry out its responsibilities in the internal security field, it is important that it know as much as possible about this country's foreign intelligence organization. It is believed that our position is continually improved by learning as much as possible about the interworkings of the Agency, its key personnel, etc. It is further believed that a lecture before CIA intelligence officers definitely would stimulate responses from CIA personnel which would be very informative.

If the Bureau refuses to supply a lecturer, CIA could record this as an act of refusal to cooperate in the best interests of the country.

The CIA knows that the Bureau lectures to other United States intelligence agencies. If the Bureau refused to lecture to the CIA, that Agency could argue that it recognized the value of Bureau assistance; that the Agency asked for the aid and that it was refused by the Bureau to the detriment of the best interests of the United States Government. It should be borne in mind that such a refusal possibly could be called to the attention of a group such as the General Mark Clark task force which is surveying CIA operations for the Hoover Commission.

#### Disadvantages

The Bureau's name could become associated with CIA training program.

If a Bureau representative lectures to CIA personnel, the Bureau's name could become associated with a CIA training program. The Bureau's participation possibly could be misinterpreted by outsiders who might gain knowledge of this. The CIA regularly has been the subject of considerable criticism. It may be to the Bureau's advantage to refrain from getting involved in any act which could be construed as an establishment of a close tie with CIA thereby avoiding Bureau involvement in any possible criticism of the CIA. Although this appears to be a disadvantage, it is mitigated by the fact that we deal with CIA on a daily basis and such an association also could be misconstrued and may be opened to varied interpretations by outsiders.

~~SECRET~~  
- 5 -

VAR/103

Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Boardman ☒  
Mr. Nichols ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. Harbo ☐  
Mr. Mohr ☐  
Mr. Parsons ☐  
Mr. Rosen ☐  
Mr. Tamm ☐  
Mr. Sizoo ☐  
Mr. Winterrowd ☐  
Tele. Room ☐  
Mr. Holloman ☐  
Miss Gandy ☐

*Roach*

ADD 4 LADEJINSKY

BENSON'S USE OF THE INITIALS NIS IN HIS LETTER TO JOHNSTON THREW THE AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT INTO A SLAP. DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICER J. GLENN CASSITY DECLINED TO TALK TO REPORTERS ABOUT THE MATTER, WHILE ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ALSO DECLINED ON GROUNDS IT WAS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

MEANWHILE, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY QUICKLY REPLIED THAT NIS STOOD FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY. A SPOKESMAN SAID HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THE PROJECT, BUT HE SAID IT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME YEARS.

THE SENATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE ALSO HAD NO QUALMS ABOUT TELLING THE REPORTERS THE INITIALS STOOD FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY.

1/26--N430P

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DATE 4/2/98 BY SP2 ETH/ALM  
Per DGA

*just what is it?*  
*H.*

*memorandum  
to Belmont  
1-27-55  
SJP/hk*

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED-89

62-10757-2495  
13 FEB 8 1955

### Who's NIS?--Everybody Won Tell Except C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times.  
WASHINGTON, Jan. 26--  
The Department of Agriculture  
jousted with security again to-  
day--and lost again.

This time the department ran  
up against the supersensitive  
Central Intelligence Agency.

Ezra Taft Benson, the Sec-  
retary of Agriculture, men-  
tioned a "NIS project" in a let-  
ter to Senator Olin D. John-  
ston, Democrat of South Caro-  
lina, on the controversial Wolf  
Ladejinsky case.

The office of John Glen Cas-  
sity, Agriculture security offi-  
cer, referred all queries on the  
meaning of "NIS" to the de-  
partment's information office.  
That office said it could not  
identify "NIS" because of se-  
curity.

At the C.I.A., "NIS" was  
readily identified as National  
Intelligence Survey, a secret  
project of the C.I.A.

Meanwhile, Mr. Cassity had  
asked the Senate committee not  
to identify NISan.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/2/98 BY SP2 Hcy

Per OGA

EHZ

New York Times - January 27, 1955

62-80750-2495

ENCLOSURE

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : Legal Attache  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

DATE: January 21, 1955

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

SUBJECT: ~~CIA~~ PUBLICITY IN BRAZIL  
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

*O.C.I.A.*  
Attached are the following items:

- 1) Clipping: The column of the journalist, RAFAEL CORREA DE OLIVEIRA in the January 18, 1955 issue of "Diario de Noticias."
- 2) Clipping: The column by the same man in the same newspaper's January 19, 1955 issue.
- 3) January 18, 1955, page 3, issue of the "Rio Press Summary" put out for Embassy consumption by USIS, this Embassy, with item, "Brazil and the Central Intelligence Agency."

"Diario de Noticias" is a daily Rio de Janeiro newspaper which is widely read. Its first page always is serious in make-up and filled with world news. It also has a big following because it publishes in great detail official notices of the armed forces. It has been reported to have Communists on its editorial staff, has a liberal sprinkling of official socialists who get a by-line in its pages, but it has been in favor of the present government and is against a return to anything like the old Vargas government. Such a stand is typical of more conservative and anti-Communist elements.

RAFAEL CORREA DE OLIVEIRA has on many occasions been in Communist-front groups, has been described variously as a socialist and a Communist.

The two articles are in the same vein and, as he says, he got his information about the way CIA works from "The Saturday Evening Post" article on that agency. He accuses the government of inertia and of being a branch of United States diplomacy, specifically as that diplomacy uses the arm of the CIA, an organization for which he has a very low regard.

3 ENCL 90

RECORDED - 90  
INDEXED - 90

21 JAN 20 1955

103  
55 FEB 10 1955

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*COPIES*  
*ESP/AR*

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ELH  
ON 4-2-88  
Per OGA

The interpretation he gives to the function and activities of CIA can best be read in attachment (3), which quite well translates the feeling and venom of the articles.

The above is for the completion of the Bureau's files.

Attachments (3)  
MC:jar

RIO PRESS SUMMARY (3)

Tuesday, January 18, 1955

National Affairs

prejudiced the interest of the national economy.  
Such aid would also protect the small depositor.  
(Diario Carioca 18-1-55)

\*\*\*\*\*

In its economic column "Diario Carioca" comments on this measure of the Finance Minister. This will prevent runs on banks in case of the failure of one. It seems a paradox that the failure of one small bank can create a general run and endanger large and solid banking establishments. It is right that the government should adopt this attitude during these troubled times. The national banking situation reflects the economic power of a people, and for this reason the government should offer some means of protection to solid banking houses.

This measure was decided upon after a detailed study by the bankers and the government, and Sr. Otavio Bulhoes, Executive Director of the SUMOC, went to Sao Paulo with the proposal. The project was approved by the Sao Paulo bankers, and will shortly go into execution. (Diario Carioca 18-1-55)

Brazil and the Central Intelligence Agency

In a long article by ~~Rafael~~ Correia de Oliveira in "Diario de Noticias", the writer strongly attacks the CIA. He says that Finance Minister Gudin may understand English economics, with its ancient problems, but he cannot understand Brazil's problem when he advises the nation to stop and take stock.

Brazilian diplomacy is almost non-existent because in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, the nation lacks the prestige for external politics. This scepticism leaves Brazil in the position of a branch of the CIA, which is the service of espionage and corruption maintained by the U.S. and directed by Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Dulles. It was this powerful organization which promoted the downfall of the constitutional government of Venezuela, upset the constitutional government of Guatemala, made a revolution in Iran against Mossadegh, deposed King Farouk in Egypt, got Batista into power in Cuba, and is now bloodying Panama and Costa Rica. The pretext for these activities are generally anti-communist protection, but the other real motives

(continued)

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DATE 5-27-88 BY SP-2 ALM/ELC

Per DGA

RIO PRESS SUMMARY (4)

Tuesday, January 18, 1955

National Affairs

which guide the CIA are known, - bananas of United Fruit, Cuban sugar, the Suez Canal, the oil of Caracas, Abadan, and the Middle East.

The Foreign Minister knows all this in detail and thinks that this intervention of Mr. Dulles' agents in the lives of the nations of the free world enormously amusing. This is why Brazil sits back waiting for orders.

The reader must not think that all this is a fantasy from Moscow. All that the writer knows of this situation came from an article in the "Saturday Evening Post" of October 30, 1954 by Richard and Gladys Harkness. The procedure for this system of espionage and intervention is classic. It consists of furnishing arms to the "rebels" of a neighboring country, corruption of the national elements which control the armed forces, "technical" North American aid, use of publicity and propaganda agencies, etc. This is carried on by the 12,000 assistants of Mr. Dulles, and promises to continue as long as there is money to corrupt, and misery to be exploited in the weaker nations.

The writer discusses the external situation in relation to the internal crisis and the desire of Gudin to paralyze Brazil. Brazil is a young country and is growing rapidly. The U.S. is also a young country, historically almost the same age as Brazil. No one ever recommended that the U.S. stop developing and await results. Here in Brazil, where 70% of the people are illiterate, where roads are practically non-existent for great distances, where there are problems of food, health, power, the nation is asked to stop because progress is too fast. According to the Finance Minister, let us stop everything, - shut down the works in the Sao Francisco Valley, shut down Petrobras, hold back Volta Redonda, deliver the manganese to Mr. Humphrey, and when the disorder is complete we can ask help from the CIA, which is developing its technique in the field, to save us from the Red Terror with gangsters like Jimenez and Somosa. (Diario de Noticias 18-1-55).

U.S. Tax on Foreign Investments

In an editorial "Correio da Manha" discusses President Eisenhower's recommendation to the U.S. Congress regarding a reduction in income tax on investments abroad. It is to be noted that the question of foreign investment was the principal

(Continued)

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DATE 5-27-92 BY SP2 ALM/ELC  
Per OGA

# CRIME E FÓLEGO

Rafael Corrêa de Oliveira

**S**EGUNDO as declarações do presidente da «Sumoc», — bem, sublinhadas num incisivo artigo do sr. Osório Nunes, domingo último, neste jornal — o Brasil deve parar. Parar para tomar fôlego... E nisto se resume, sem dúvida, a ciência do estafado sr. Eugênio Gudín, que entende muito da economia inglesa, com os seus problemas da velhice, a concentrar-se para sobreviver, pois já lhe passou a idade do crescimento e da expansão.

O nosso prezado amigo dr. Otávio Bulhões viu o Brasil correndo, com a língua de fora, sem outro recurso senão parar para não morrer. Essa falsa visão de porre, naturalmente da convivência com as múmias deste governo. A diplomacia brasileira, por exemplo, não se mexe, porque, na opinião do sábio chanceler, faltam a nosso país condições de prestígio para termos uma política internacional. E este cepticismo deixa-nos na posição de linha auxiliar da «Central Intelligence Agency», que é o serviço de espionagem e corrupção mantido pelos Estados Unidos e dirigido pelo sr. Allen Dulles, irmão do secretário Foster Dulles. Foi essa poderosa organização que promoveu a queda do governo constitucional da Venezuela, derrubou o governo constitucional da Guatemala, fez a revolução no Iran contra Mossadegue, depôs o rei Faruk no Egito, empoleirou Batista em Cuba, — e está agora sanguentando o Panamá e Costa Rica. Os pretextos para essas aventuras são, geralmente, as atividades comunistas, embora se saiba que outros motivos reais guiam o braço e o dinheiro da «Central Intelligence Agency», — a saber: bananas da «United Fruit», açúcar de Cuba, canal de Suez no Egito, petróleo do Caracas, Abadan, e Oriente Médio.

O sr. Raul Fernandes conhece tudo isso detalhadamente e acha uma graça enorme no jeito com que os agentes de Allen Dulles intervêm na vida das outras nações do mundo livre. Por isso o Brasil fica parado, exausto de tomar fôlego no Itamarati, à espera das ordens com que devemos concordar.

Não julgue o leitor que esta-

Raul Fernandes ter parado o Itamarati, pois se existe a «Central Intelligence Agency», sob os cuidados de Allen Dulles — para que o Brasil pensar e agir? A nossa diplomacia, no máximo, será a linha auxiliar desses serviços que já salvaram a civilização cristã em tantos lugares.

Essas referências ao setor internacional são feitas aqui, exatamente, por causa da situação interna. O sr. Eugênio Gudín quer parar o Brasil, pois acha que estamos correndo muito. Para que tanta indústria, tanta estrada, tantas cidades, tantos empreendimentos novos? Devemos parar como a nossa diplomacia: cochilar e esperar...

O cinismo dessa política levanta suspeitas tremendas: O sr. Eugênio Gudín deve ter aprendido na Inglaterra que os maiores filósofos da história desde Oswald Spengler até Toynbee aceitam para as sociedades humanas, no seu desenvolvimento, as leis cíclicas irrevivíveis, que governam a vida dos seres biológicos: a infância, a juventude, a idade adulta, a velhice. O Brasil, sem dúvida, se acha em plena juventude. O seu crescimento está aquém da sua idade e das suas possibilidades. Fazê-lo parar nesta altura da vida, seria inutilizar-lhe as energias, retardar-lhe o desenvolvimento, deixar para as hesitações e a calma da maturidade o esforço realizador que reclama todos os entusiasmos, toda fé, todo dinamismo da mocidade.

Os Estados Unidos se consideram um povo jovem. A sua idade histórica, entretanto, é idêntica à nossa. A sua independência política se antecipou à do Brasil em pouco mais de 40 anos. E ninguém se lembraria de pedir aos americanos que parassem para tomar fôlego! Ao contrário disto, tudo ali é movimento, — a pressa, cresce e edifica as novas concepções de progresso humano para aproveitar o ciclo da primavera na vida nacional.

Aqui, no Brasil, onde há 70% de analfabetos, as estradas não existem praticamente em função das enormes distâncias, as comunicações são deficientes, a alimentação, o saneamento, a energia, tudo é precário, quando há, — pois, que em dois terços do

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5-22-98 BY SP2 ALM/EHL  
Per OG A

"DIARIO DE NOTICIAS"  
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZI  
JANUARY 18, 1955

ENCLOSURE, 62-80750-2497



espera das ordens com que devemos concordar.  
Não julgue o leitor que estamos fantasiando ou apenas divulgando falsa propaganda de Moscou. Tudo quanto sabemos sobre a «Central Intelligence Agency» foi lido em três reportagens de Richard e Gladys Harkness, na prestigiosa revista norte-americana «The Saturday Evening Post», edição de 30 de outubro de 1954. E é ali que os diretores do serviço de espionagem e agitação política norte-americana, em revelações que o sr. Raul Fernandes achará esplêndidas, contam como se deu a sua intervenção na Guatemala, no Irã, no Egito, em defesa da civilização cristã. Os processos são clássicos: a) fornecimento de armas, a revoltosos mobilizados nos países vizinhos; b) corrupção de elementos nacionais que controlam forças armadas; c) auxílio de técnicos norte-americanos em agitações, desordens de rua, utilização de meios de publicidade, etc., etc.  
Os 12.000 auxiliares do sr. Allen Dulles se vangloriam dessas façanhas e prometem continuar enquanto houver muito dinheiro para corromper e muita miséria a explorar nos países fracos que pretendam ser livres e donos de suas riquezas vivas ou potenciais.  
Deve ser esta a razão do sr.

50-2497  
mentação, o saneamento, a energia, tudo é precário, quando há — pois, que em dois terços do país reinam a miséria e o abandono. — teremos de parar porque estamos progredindo de mais!  
O ministro da Fazenda que, por ignorância, se dispusesse a uma política dessa ordem não poderia continuar no exercício de suas funções. Mas o ministro que se proclama sábio e age do mesmo modo, deve ser julgado pelo crime tremendo que está cometendo conscientemente a serviço de interesses contrários aos da sua pátria.  
É preciso parar o Brasil! Vamos suspender as obras do São Francisco. Fechemos a «Petrobrás». Evitemos que Volta Redonda se desenvolva. Apertemos os torniquetes no crânio da indústria e dos bancos nacionais. Entreguemos o manganês a mister Humphrey. E quando isto estiver em desordem enorme e em decadência precoce, pegamos a «Central Intelligence Agency» que desenvolva a sua técnica nos campos e nas cidades salvando-nos da barbaria vermelha com um capanga qualquer do tipo Somosa ou Jimenez.  
Neste dia, vitoriosamente, os srs. Eugênio Gudin e Raul Fernandes sentir-se-ão mais jovens do que o Brasil. E terão corrido muito, sem necessidade de parar, para tomar fôlego...

# PETROLEO E... CONFUSÕES

*Rafael Corrêa do Oliveira*

**E** CONSTRANGIDAMENTE que vamos impedir o «Correio da Manhã» de fazer confusão nessa marmelada da «Gulf Oil Corporation» com a refinaria dos Irmãos Soares Sampaio: a propósito de fretes marítimos.

Os ilustres confrades têm dois objetivos: a) salvar a face britânica do ministro Gudín acariciada pelo ministro Bittencourt Sampaio; b) deixar no espírito público a dúvida sobre a honestidade da «Petrobrás» no controle oficial da produção de petróleo.

O leitor imbecil não penetra no labirinto dos incidentes e logo se deixa influenciar pelos títulos sugestivos. O leitor safado utiliza o material para a propaganda e vai aumentando a confusão nas conversas sobre o assunto. E o leitor de boa fé, apressado, pode ficar na dúvida...

Esses efeitos psicológicos têm uma grande influência na opinião pública. E' o que nos ensina, por exemplo, o informante da CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) conforme se lê no pé deste artigo...

O fato denunciado e agitado pelo «Correio da Manhã» nada tem com a «Petrobrás» e o monopólio nacional que explora o petróleo. Trata-se de assunto particular, pura iniciativa privada, um negócio realizado entre três grupos de comerciantes: a) os Irmãos Soares Sampaio, amigos íntimos do dr. Paulo de Bettencourt, moços da alta roda, proprietários da refinaria de Capuava que o «Correio da Manhã» discretamente chama de «União»; b) a «Gulf Oil Corporation», consórcio americano entrosado no mecanismo do truste internacional; c) a «Transmarin», empresa brasileira, que obteve da «Gulf» o contrato de transportes.

Tratando-se de organizações privadas, como sabemos, a regra é ganhar o mais possível, uma vencendo a outra na corrida dos lucros. Os Irmãos Sampaio assinaram o seu contrato em 1952 pensando que faziam ótimo negócio. Bons comerciantes estavam certos da sua agilidade e segurança na fixação dos preços. Mas agora vendo que a «Petrobrás», isto é, o governo, lora mais hábil e conseguira fretes inferiores, ficaram desapontados. Seus lucros diminuíram e era preciso agir para evitar semelhante calamidade. O caminho legal seria a rescisão do contrato na Justiça. Mas os simpáticos rapazes não tinham direito a isso e não con-

midiação pela imprensa, as notas imperativas do «Correio da Manhã», — o recurso à boa amizade nos entendimentos do grupo. (Neste particular não devemos esquecer que o sr. Carlos Lacerda foi demitido do «Correio» porque escreveu um artigo sob o título: — «Um grupo está aguardando o Brasil», — e o grupo era precisamente o dos simpáticos Irmãos Sampaio da atual refinaria...).

Os homens da «Transmarin» que se arranjaram com a «Gulf Corporation» e foram mais inteligentes nos golpes e contra golpes da iniciativa privada do que os gentis-homens de Capuava, colocaram a questão muito bem nos seguintes termos: — O que não é normal é um dos contratantes querer reexaminar um contrato a prazo longo quando determinada condição nele contida lhe for desfavorável.

Pior do que isso, porque, imoral é envolver-se, a imprensa em assunto dessa natureza para intimidar uma das partes contratantes e mistificar a opinião como se estivesse em jogo o interesse público.

Devemos, portanto, falar por cima, desse barulho todo para deixar as coisas nos seus lugares e reduzir os fatos às suas proporções. Os Irmãos Soares Sampaio, donos da refinaria de Capuava (União para despiatar) contrataram com a Gulf Oil Corporation, em 1952, pelo prazo de cinco anos, o transporte de 6.000 barris de óleo, entre Kuweit e Santos, ao preço de \$ 1.52 por unidade. Depois disso a «Gulf» vendeu o contrato a «Transmarin». Agora, os distintos moços, vendo a «Petrobrás» transportar o seu óleo a 94 centavos sentiram que haviam feito um mau negócio com a «Gulf», em 1952. E querem desfazer o contrato com uma campanha do «Correio da Manhã».

De tudo isto fica uma excelente lição: o negócio, entre particulares tem a vantagem de a parte mais esperta, ou menos séria, embulhar a outra. Com o governo, — a Petrobrás, no caso, — havendo responsabilidade e honestidade, não se corre tal risco...

Acreditamos que os nossos ilustres confrades do «Correio da Manhã» não nos querirão mal por estas simples interpretações ao altruísmo de suas notas impetuosas, no alto da primeira página, em honra e pela vida da

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Per OGA

EH

"DIARIO DE NOTICIAS"  
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL  
JANUARY 19, 1955

ENCLOSURE

62-80750-2497

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL  
JANUARY 19, 1955

ENCLOSURE

haviam na fragilidade dos juizes.  
Havia, porém, outro recurso que  
era o escândalo público, a inti-

patia.  
ASSOCIAÇÃO DE IDEIAS  
Encontramos ainda, nos Itálicos  
de um espirituoso colunista do  
«Correio», o seguinte delicioso  
trecho:

«Pôsto Jânio fora do páreo, di-  
tivelmente aparecerá outro que o  
substitua».

Há homens da primeira ordem  
por aí além, sei disso, mas pre-  
cisamente porque são de primei-  
ra ordem não servem. Para con-  
correr com Juscelino só um de-  
magogo endinheirado ou que  
tenha pelas costas aventureiros  
dispostos a inverter capitais no  
brinquedo. Ademar ou Jânio  
eram os únicos. Fora daí, não  
veja saída».

Similia similibus... Res-  
ponda o sr. Juscelino.

0  
«a little doing». — Conforme  
prometemos no início do artigo  
aqui está uma parte da interes-  
sante revelação do «Saturday  
Evening Post» sobre a interven-  
ção americana no Iran, «a little  
doing» que, também, poderia ou  
poderá ser tentado aqui: «O caso  
requeria uma pequena ação. E  
esta começou rapidamente atra-  
vés de circunstâncias mais que  
novelescas envolvendo Dulles, um  
diplomata, uma princesa e um  
policial». O diplomata: Lol Han-  
derson, embaixador americano.  
A princesa: Ashraf, irmã do rei  
e agente da C. I. A. O polí-  
cial: Schwarkoff, agente da C.  
I. A., amigo e conselheiro do  
general Zahedi e organizador da  
guarda pessoal do rei. Com o  
dinheiro da C. I. A. (Central  
Intelligence Agency) organizaram  
uma procissão de manifestantes,  
subvencionaram agitadores, men-  
digos, desocupados, a escória das  
favelas de Teheran e fizeram nas  
ruas uma demonstração contra  
Mossadegue influenciando psico-  
logicamente as tropas da guarda.  
E, assim, ao cair da noite, se-  
guindo o estilo americano mili-  
tar e a sua logística, as tropas  
realistas cercaram Mossadegue  
no seu palácio. Resultado desse  
little doing: Abadan voltou aos  
ingleses, mas os americanos avan-  
çaram em metade do negócio.  
— R.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: January 21, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

Per OGA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 4/6/98 BY SP-2 ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
 SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
 OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
 SURVEY OF CIA BY GENERAL MARK W. CLARK

Tolson ☒  
 Boardman ☒  
 Nichols ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Parsons ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Tamm ☒  
 Sizoo ☒  
 Winterrowd ☒  
 Tele. Room ☒  
 Holloman ☒  
 Gandy ☒

Reference is made to my memorandum dated January 19, 1955 wherein I indicated that General James George Christiansen, Head of General Mark Clark's Working Committee, would be submitting a name check request to the Bureau within a few days. You will recall that General Christiansen indicated that the checks would pertain to CIA employees who allegedly had questionable security backgrounds.

Attached hereto is a memorandum dated January 20, 1955, furnished to Agent S. J. Papich by General Christiansen on January 21, 1955, in which communication there is set forth a list of individuals. General Christiansen requests that the Bureau furnish available information concerning the persons listed.

General Christiansen confidentially advised Agent Papich that the list was furnished to General Mark Clark by Senator McCarthy and that all of the individuals allegedly are employed by CIA. General Christiansen stated that he personally did not know if Senator McCarthy furnished any additional information other than the names.

Agent Papich informed General Christiansen that the Bureau would give prompt attention to the requests and it was again pointed out that if the Bureau furnished name check information from its files, the Bureau desired that the communications or reports transmitted to the Clark Committee be returned to the Bureau after the Committee completed its survey. General Christiansen stated that this definitely would be done. Agent Papich again cautioned General Christiansen that under no circumstances did the Bureau desire that any of the

Attachment

SJP:jlf

(6)

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - J. W. Brown

1 - Papich

1 - Section Tickler

50 FEB 10 1955 103

21 FEB 9 1955

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information be made available to any person or agency outside of the Clark Committee. Agent Papich emphasized to General Christiansen that the Bureau was in a position where it desired to cooperate with the Clark Committee but under no circumstances did the Bureau wish to be left in the position where it could be accused of sniping at other U. S. Agencies. General Christiansen then stated that in the event that the Clark Committee found it necessary to utilize Bureau information in a discussion with the CIA he, General Christiansen, would first confer with the Bureau before initiating any such discussions.

ACTION:

The Bureau files are being checked concerning individuals listed in the attached communication from the Clark Committee. You will be informed of the results of the Bureau file review prior to the transmittal of the data to the Clark Committee.

2B

mm

11



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


GENERAL ACCOUNTING  
OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Samuel Papich, Liaison Officer with Task Force,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

In connection with my recent conversation with you concerning  
information we need on individuals, it is requested that the FBI  
furnish this Task Force with all the information available on the  
following individuals:

- S memo
- S NI
- S IR
- S IR
- No Juv.
- S Memo
- S NI
- S memo
- S memo
- S memo
- S IR
- S memo
- S memo



This pertains only to  
derog. subversive info.  
SPO

b3

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ON 4/3/98  
Per OGA

Memo to Boardman  
from Belmont  
date 1-21-55  
SgP

111-73

RECORDED 24

James G. Christiansen  
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired  
Staff Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62-80750-2501

21 FEB 9 1955

General Mark Clark's  
Working Committee  
Survey of CIA  
allow file copy

lcc-Mr. Landis  
lcc-Mr. Boardman  
lcc-Mr. Belmont  
lcc-Section Tickler

January 28, 1955

18526

[redacted]  
An applicant type investigation concerning [redacted] b3  
[redacted] was conducted by this Bureau in January,  
and February, 1951, at the request of the Central  
Intelligence Agency. No derogatory information concerning  
[redacted] was developed during that investigation and copies  
of the investigative reports were furnished to the Central  
Intelligence Agency on February 19, 1951. Our files  
contain no identifiable derogatory information concerning  
[redacted] subsequent to the above-mentioned investigation.

(118-8849)

The afore-going information is the result of an  
FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance  
or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information  
is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Note on yellow:

Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee  
Survey of CIA. *on 2/8/55 DDB*

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a  
memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955.  
*Feb. 2,*

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DATE 5-22-98 BY SP2 BJA/EHL  
Rc 06A

JGL:ph *PH*  
(7)  
*JL*

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

62-80750-2502  
ENCLOSURE

Clark's Work-  
ee Survey of CIA  
copy

lcc-Mr. Boardman  
lcc-Mr. Belmont  
lcc-Section Tickler

January 28, 1955

18528

[REDACTED]

An applicant-type investigation of [REDACTED] was conducted by this Bureau during December, 1941, and January, 1942. At the request of another Government agency the investigation was brought up to date during November, and December, 1949. The investigation developed no information reflecting adversely upon the loyalty of [REDACTED]. Copies of the investigative reports of the above-mentioned investigation were furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency on January 5, 1950. (77-13829; 123-4028)

b3

The foregoing information is the result of an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Note on yellow:

Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee Survey of CIA. *on 2/8/55*

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955.

*Feb. 2,*

JGL:ph/bpk *ph*

*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 11-2-77 BY 1045*

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

62-80750-2502  
ENCLOSURE



cc-General Mark Clark's  
Working Committee  
Survey of CIA

lcc-Yellow file copy  
lcc-Mr. Landis  
lcc-Mr. Boardman  
lcc-Mr. Belmont  
lcc-Section Tickler

18522

January 28, 1955

b3

[redacted]  
An applicant type investigation concerning [redacted] was conducted by this Bureau in March, and April, 1950, at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency. No derogatory information concerning [redacted] was developed during that investigation and copies of the investigative reports were furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency on April 28, 1950. Our files contain no identifiable derogatory information concerning him subsequent to the above-mentioned investigation. (118-6627)

The afore-going information is the result of an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Note on yellow:

Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee  
Survey of CIA. *on 2/8/55 428*

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955.  
*Feb. 2,*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 4-7-98 BY SP-6 DML/HL  
*Per OGA*

*9/1*  
JGL:ph *ph*  
(7)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*62-80750-2502*

UNCLASSIFIED

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 2, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
 SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
 OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
 SURVEY OF CIA BY GENERAL MARK W. CLARK

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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 DATE 4-7-88 BY SP2 AML/CHC

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated January 21, 1955, in the above-captioned matter, wherein it was pointed out that General James George Christiansen, Head of General Mark Clark's Working Committee, had submitted a list of thirteen names of individuals to be checked through Bureau files. These individuals are alleged to be CIA employees who had questionable security backgrounds. The thirteen individuals upon whom General Christiansen requested name checks are as follows:

There is no record in our files pertaining to [redacted] and [redacted]. Attached are memoranda setting forth the results of the file reviews concerning the other individuals.

With reference to [redacted] the attached memoranda advise that we have not conducted any investigation concerning them and our files contain no identifiable derogatory information. [redacted] have been the subjects of nonderogatory applicant-type investigations conducted by the Bureau, the results of which were furnished to CIA, and the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, is being so advised.

Concerning the following individuals: [redacted] - No investigation of [redacted] has been conducted by the Bureau.

[redacted] furnished a memorandum prepared by him setting forth various allegations concerning [redacted] which include possible inferences of disloyalty. On October 29, 1951, the Washington Field Office was requested to ascertain if

JGL:mmm:lw  
 (5)

Attachments (22)

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Liaison Section Tickler

RECORDED - 24  
 INDEXED - 24

FEB 9 1955

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 62-1250-2502  
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Memo to Boardman

18519

[redacted] was employed by the U. S. Government within the purview of Executive Order 9835; also, to ascertain his background with a view to possibly opening a loyalty investigation of him. A check of [redacted]

b3

b7D

Referral/Consult

[redacted] On September 10, 1953, Don Surine of the McCarthy Committee staff told Mr. Nichols "off the record" that [redacted]

[redacted] Results of that investigation furnished to CIA on March 24, 1954. Investigation reflected that [redacted]

b3

Referral/Consult

\* [redacted]  
[redacted] No information in Bufiles to indicate he is or ever was an employee of CIA. [redacted] was the subject of a security-type investigation by the Bureau from July, 1949, to August, 1952. This investigation was predicated upon information that [redacted]

b3

Memo to Boardman .

18520

b3  
b7D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - No investigation has been conducted by the Bureau concerning but our files reflect that in November, 1951, a source of unknown reliability ([REDACTED]) advised that [REDACTED]

b3  
b7D

[REDACTED] The SAC, New York, in submitting this information to the Bureau stated that he did not believe that it was of "sufficient credence to be passed along to other governmental agencies." The source, according to SAC, New York, made statements that bordered upon being lurid and sensational and he admittedly had no facts upon which his general conclusions were based. The Bureau, upon receipt of this information and the SAC's recommendation as to its future dissemination, evaluated the information and concurred with those recommendations; therefore, the information was not furnished to CIA at that time and it is not being furnished to either CIA or General Mark Clark at this time for the same reasons. Our files also show that one [REDACTED] was described by a source of unknown reliability [REDACTED]

b3  
b7D

[REDACTED] This information has not been furnished to CIA as Bureau Liaison Agent advises CIA is cognizant of same [REDACTED] This information is being given to General Clark at this time as it may pertain to the subject of his inquiry. [REDACTED] has not been the subject of a Bureau investigation. Our files show, however, that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]

b3  
b7D

[REDACTED] This information furnished CIA 1-9-48.

In those instances where our files show that we have derogatory information concerning the individual and that such information came from other Government agencies, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has been referred to those agencies.

18521

Memo to Boardman

No loyalty investigation has been conducted concerning [redacted] as he was never employed in the Executive Branch of the Government. [redacted]

[redacted] No loyalty investigation was initiated concerning [redacted] in view of the fact that CIA is cognizant of the information concerning them and has not requested the investigation. No loyalty investigation has been conducted concerning [redacted] in [redacted]

b3

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached memoranda be furnished General James George Christiansen, via Liaison, and that the Liaison representative orally advise General Christiansen that we have no record in our files concerning [redacted]

b3

Memoranda given to  
Col. John G. Shubelde  
& Clark task force on  
2/8/55. He was advised  
re [redacted]

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: JG, JMW, X, V, GK, D.]*

b3

18543



b3  
Referral/Consult

No investigation has been conducted by this Bureau concerning [redacted] however, information available reflects that [redacted]

(121-34308)

The afore-going information is the result of an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Note on yellow:

Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee Survey of CIA. on 2/8/55

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955. Feb. 21

JGL:ph  
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-27-88 BY 292 ALB/ML

Per OSA

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED  
FBI  
MARCH 2 1955

ENCLOSURE

62-80850-2502

CONFIDENTIAL

Gen. Mark Clark's

Working Committee, Survey  
of CIA

- 1 - Byyellow
- 1 - Mr. Landis
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Sect. Tick. File

February 1, 1955

18541

b3

The above-captioned individual has not been investi-  
gated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, our  
files contain information concerning [redacted] from a source of  
unknown reliability [redacted]

b3  
b7D

source stated that [redacted]

(100-350685-6)

In addition to the information set forth above, the  
[redacted] reflect  
that [redacted]

He was born [redacted]

He was listed for Selective Service at Local Board  
No. 275, New York City. (65-44483-782)

b3

You may also desire to consult [redacted]

b3

for additional information concerning [redacted] Referral/Consult  
(140-341-49; 140-3875-25; 100-350-856-4)

The foregoing information is the result of an  
FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or  
nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is  
furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Orig to Gen. Mark Clark's  
Working Committee, Survey of CIA

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

This blank memorandum attachment for A.H. Belmont to Mr. Boardman  
memo dated 2-2-55, JGL

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE

2c General Mark Clark's  
Working Committee Survey  
of CIA

lcc-Yellow file copy  
lcc-Mr. Landis  
lcc-Mr. Boardman  
lcc-Mr. Belmont  
lcc-Section Tickler

18539

January 28, 1955

b3

[REDACTED]

b3

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] has not been the subject of  
an investigation by the FBI and our files contain no  
pertinent identifiable information concerning him. You  
may wish to check [REDACTED]  
for additional information concerning [REDACTED]

The foregoing information is the result of an  
FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance  
or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information  
is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Note on yellow:

Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee  
Survey of CIA. *encl 1/28/55 JGL*

on 3/31/53 the Bureau was advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a  
memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-7-98 BY SP-5 JGL/MLH  
Per OGA

JGL:ph/tab  
(7)

FEB 1 11 34 AM '55

ENCLOSURE

62-80750-250



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

dupl with orig  
1 yellow  
1 Mr. Boardman  
1 Mr. Belmont  
1 Mr. Landis  
1 Section Tickler  
1 Mr. Young

18537

January 26, 1955

b3

No investigation has been conducted by this Bureau concerning [redacted]

[redacted] Our files do reflect, however, that on April 15, 1947, an individual of unknown reliability advised that [redacted]

b3  
b7D

[redacted] This source added, however, that he was certain that [redacted]

Based on the limited identifying information furnished it is not possible to determine if the above individual is identical with the subject of your inquiry.

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated outside of your agency.

(Info received from Congressman Thomas D'Alesandro of Maryland on 4-15-47, who furnished a letter dated [redacted] from [redacted])

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2-2-91 BY SP-2 JLM/ML

100-353462-1, 2; 100-350685-6)

b3  
b7D

NOTE: This blank memo is attachment to memo Belmont to Boardman, 2-2-55, JGL:lw

PG YOUNG: lw, saw, mnm

(8)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Orig and copy to General Mark Clark's Working Committee, Survey of CIA.

on 2/18/55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62-80750-2502

ENCLOSURE

General Mark Clark's  
Working Committee, Survey  
of CIA

- 1 yellow
- 1 Mr. Landis
- 1 Mr. Boardman
- 1 Mr. Belmont
- 1 Section Tickler

January 28, 1955

18535

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted] has not been the subject of an investigation by the FBI and our files contain no pertinent identifiable information concerning her.

b3

The foregoing information is the result of an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

NOTE: Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee, Survey of CIA. *on 2/8/55 JGL*

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955.

*File 2 -*

JGL:ph/mnm

*Jh*

*mnm*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/12/82 BY SP2 JML/ML  
100 1264

NOTE: Due to lack of identifying data furnished by General Mark Clark's Working Committee, Bureau reference 116-8891 re [Redacted] could not be identified with the above captioned subject.

b3

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

62-80750

*mon* *AKF*  
3  
2502

ENCLOSURE

2 cc-General Mark Clark's  
Working Committee  
Survey of CIA  
1 cc-Yellow file copy  
1 cc-Mr. Landis  
1 cc-Mr. Boardman  
1cc-Mr. Belmont  
1cc-Section Tickler

January 28, 1955

18533

b3

[redacted] has not been the subject of an investigation by the FBI and our files contain no pertinent identifiable information concerning him.

b3

The foregoing information is the result of an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

Note on yellow:

Original to General Mark Clark's Working Committee.  
Survey of CIA. *on 2/8/55*  
*ARF*

This blank memorandum is an attachment to a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated January 28, 1955.

JGL:ph;mlp

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-1-81 BY 1045 JAL/CLW  
FOR OOB

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

65-80750-2-502  
ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

General Mark Clark's  
Working Committee,  
Survey of CIA  
1 yellow  
1 Mr. Landis  
1 Mr. Boardman  
1 Mr. Belmont  
1 Section Tickler

January 28, 1955

18530

b3

The FBI conducted a security-type investigation concerning [redacted] from July, 1949, to August, 1952. This investigation was predicated upon information from a source believed to be reliable than [redacted]

b3  
b7D

Our investigation failed to support this conclusion concerning [redacted]

An informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has described [redacted]

b3  
b7D

100-362996-45)

[redacted] has been associated with the following organizations which have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450:

- 62-86750-250
- (1) American Russian Institute
  - (2) National Council of American-Russian Friendship
  - (3) Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder

b3

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: Orig to Gen. Mark Clark's Working Committee, Survey of CIA

JGL:ph/mmm

on 2/8/55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

This blank memo is an attachment to a memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 1-28-55.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18534

- (4) Washington Bookshop Association
- (5) Washington Committee to Win the Peace,  
affiliate of National Committee to Win the Peace

Other cited organizations:

- (1) Washington Committee for Aid to China  
(Cited by the House Committee on Un-American  
Activities as a Communist controlled organization)
- (2) Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)

The IPR was founded in 1925 in Hawaii as an organization engaged in research on the economic, political, and social aspects of countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean. As a result of documentary evidence and testimony from witnesses who appeared during 1951 and 1952 before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, this Committee concluded in its report dated July 2, 1953, that while most members of the IPR (including the American Council of the IPR, succeeded by the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.) and its Board of Trustees were inactive and without any influence over the policies of the organization, and while the names of eminent individuals were by design used as a responsible and impressive screen for the activities of the IPR inner core, the activities, administration and policies of the IPR were controlled by a small core of Communists or pro-Communist personnel; that the IPR was considered by the American CP and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Soviet policy, propaganda and military intelligence; that the IPR was used as a channel for Communist and Soviet propaganda and its leadership used IPR prestige to promote the interests of the Soviet Union; that the IPR had for its chief function the influencing of US public opinion and was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policies; and that persons associated with the IPR were instrumental in keeping US policy on a course favorable to Communist objectives in China.

The foregoing information is the result of an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or nonclearance of the individual involved. The information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

OK

FROM HONOLULU 2-9-55 NR 090310 1:31 AM

DIRECTOR URGENT

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

CLARK COMMITTEE, MISCELLANEOUS. RE HONOLULU RAD  
FEBRUARY 4 LAST. MEMBERS OF CLARK COMMITTEE NOTED IN  
REFERENCED RAD DEPARTED HONOLULU 11:00 AM 8TH INSTANT  
FOR MANILA.

[REDACTED]

RECEIVED: 2-9-55 1:40 AM LR

b3

RECORDED-62

INDEXED-62

EX-125

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-8-98 BY SP2 ALW/EHL  
Per OGA

62-85750-2505

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-85750-1

DC: MR. BELMONT  
AND SUPERVISOR  
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

Mr. Belmont

66 FEB 17 1955

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE:  
February 8, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT;  
SURVEY OF CIA BY GENERAL MARK W. CLARK

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to

On February 8, 1955, Colonel John J. Dubbelde of the Clark task force advised Agent Papich that General Christiansen and others had left for the Far East for the purpose of conferring with intelligence representatives of the Army, Air Force, Navy and the CIA. Dubbelde stated that Christiansen definitely had not planned to confer with the Bureau office in Honolulu.

In his radiogram of February 4, 1955, the SAC at Honolulu advised that if any of the Clark committee called on him they would be treated courteously but no information would be given in the absence of instructions to the contrary.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ENCL.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-98 BY SP-2 JHC

Per OGA

Attachment

SJP:fjb  
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

1500

125

66 FEB 17 1955

INDEXED-62

13 FEB 11 1955

62-80750-2506

L. Wilson

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-88575-1

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

~~SECRET~~

DATE:

February 14, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
COVERAGE OF SOVIET POLITICAL SITUATION

Tolson	✓
Boardman	✓
Nichols	✓
Belmont	✓
Harbo	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Sizoo	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

SYNOPSIS:

Attached is Washington City News Service release of 2-8-55 quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey as criticizing the Administration's intelligence facilities for not having advance indications of recent shake-up in Soviet Government. Also attached is Drew Pearson column of 2-12-55 which implies that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) may have unusually placed coverage in Russia.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Attachment

SJP:sjb  
(4)

1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Pappach

RECORDED-62  
INDEXED-62

21 FEB 25 1955

EX-110

62-80750-2511

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 109-12-240-7



Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

~~SECRET~~

DETAILS:

Reference is made to the attached Washington City News Service release of February 8, 1955, wherein Senator Hubert Humphrey is quoted as criticizing the Administration's intelligence facilities for not having advance indications of the recent shake-up in the Soviet Government. Senator Humphrey stated that private sources in universities and elsewhere have called the turn on many Soviet moves when the Administration apparently was not expecting them. (X) (u)

There is also attached hereto the Drew Pearson column of February 12, 1955, wherein Pearson writes that Khrushchev double-crossed Malenkov. In his column Pearson refers to information "pieced together by the CIA" and he implies that CIA has developed information concerning the struggle within the Kremlin from agents and defectors. (X) (u)

From all evidence available to the Bureau, the CIA definitely does not have any worthwhile coverage in Moscow and definitely has not developed any sources close to the Kremlin.

b3

(X) (u)

b3

On February 8, 1955, Nikita Khrushchev made his speech nominating Bulganin as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. In his speech, Khrushchev made what was almost a passing reference to the "Council of Elders." He did not elaborate concerning this "Council of Elders" and from all indications this terminology has never been used before by the Soviets in describing their governmental structure. (X) (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0-20  
Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Boardman ✓  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. Harbo ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Parsons ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Sizoo ✓  
Mr. Winterrowd ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Mr. Holloman ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

Classified by *DA 12/14/99*  
Declassify on: OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(HUMPHREY)  
SEN. HUBERT HUMPHREY CALLED FOR CREATION OF A SPECIAL SENATE FOREIGN  
RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE TO KEEP ABREAST OF THE LATEST INFORMATION  
FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES ON SOVIET STRATEGY.  
THE MINNESOTA DEMOCRAT, A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,  
CRITICIZED THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES FOR NOT HAVING  
ADVANCE INDICATIONS OF TODAY'S SHAKEUP IN THE SOVIET PREMIERSHIP.  
IF THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ANY SUCH INFORMATION, "WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT  
IT IN HERE," HUMPHREY SAID, POINTING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
ROOM.  
HUMPHREY SAID "PRIVATE SOURCES" IN UNIVERSITIES AND ELSEWHERE HAVE  
CALLED THE TURN ON MANY SOVIET MOVES WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY  
WAS NOT EXPECTING THEM.  
HE SAID HE WAS "RATHER SHOCKED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL  
ANALYSIS FACILITIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS HAD NO INFORMATION AS  
TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS, OR AT LEAST DIDN'T GIVE MUCH CREDENCE TO  
IT, WHILE SOME PRIVATE SOURCES HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR MONTHS THAT  
KHRUSHCHEV WAS THE MAJOR FORCE IN SOVIET POLITICS TODAY."

*memo Room  
to Belmont  
2-14-55  
55P/6-16*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP7 CCL/aw*  
ON *9/4/94* C.A. # *88-1826*

ENCLOSURE  
*62-80750-2571*

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

# Khrushchev Betrayed Benefactor

By Drew Pearson

President Eisenhower has expressed the following general views on the Russian purge to some of his close political observers:

On the whole, he does not feel that the replacement of Malenkov is a harbinger of war.

On the contrary, he feels that the opposite may be true and that the new setup in Russia may be embarking on a stronger policy of coexistence, without war.

This belief is based on two things:

1. Ike believes Malenkov was relieved because he was committing Russia to too much support of the Chinese Communists, a position untenable to the "peace" propaganda of the Kremlin.

2. Ike also believes that the Russian leaders are too well satisfied with the territorial conquests they have made in the last 10 years and probably figure they have nothing to gain from being tied too closely to the Formosan action, or anything else that might lead to a general war.

Ike feels that inasmuch as the Soviets have enslaved 800 million people in the last 10 years through the cold-war technique, they are not likely to embark on a new policy leading to a general war—all the more so when you consider that Communist plans look ahead to centuries of absorbing other nations.

## Kremlin Double-Cross

The power struggle inside the Kremlin, as pieced together by the Central Intelligence Agency, is a fantastic story of double-cross. At one time, for example, Premier Georgi Malenkov, now ousted, came to the rescue of Communist Party boss Nikita Khrushchev, who promptly turned on his benefactor.

Here is the fabulous, untold story:

After the dreaded Stalin died, the intrigue became so thick inside the Kremlin that Secret Police Chief Lavrenti Beria imported an American-made lock for his home. As it later turned out, the lock did him no good. But for a while Beria used his feared secret force to make a temporary hold in the power struggle.

A Malenkov, a smooth, cunning politician, held his own by making political alliances with the Red army's popular fighting generals. Low man in the triumvirate was stern, bald Khrushchev, who kept a shaky hold on the Communist Party organization.

Beria shrewdly chose to pick off the weakest member of the triumvirate and turned his secret police loose on Khrushchev. They began by going after Khrushchev's trusted but lesser henchmen. It was at this point that Malenkov stepped in to save Khrushchev who, otherwise, would have been eliminated.

The wily Malenkov, realizing that Beria would emerge all-powerful if he purged Khrushchev, made a secret pact with the harassed Communist Party boss. From what the CIA has learned from agents and defectors, Malenkov and Khrushchev joined forces to overthrow the hated Beria.

Backed up by Red army troops and tanks, Malenkov arrested Beria in the dead of night, accused him of treason and eventually sent him to his death. This is the very fate, apparently, that Beria had planned for Khrushchev.

## Crafty Khrushchev

The tough, ruthless Khrushchev wasted no time being grateful, but set out to overthrow the man who had saved his neck. First, Khrushchev strengthened his hold on the Communist Party by shaking up the personnel. In one province alone—the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic—he shifted two thirds of the regional party secretaries. Similar, if less drastic, personnel purges were carried out in the other provinces.

Meanwhile, Malenkov, appointed by an Alexandrovich Serov to head up the shatterd secret police. At some point, however, Serov was bought off by Khrushchev. Serov's reward was to be elevated to cabinet rank, which was arranged by Khrushchev almost simultaneously with Malenkov's resignation.

To offset Malenkov's influence with the Red army Khrushchev made overtures to the political generals, as opposed to the fighting generals. As War Minister Nikolai Bulganin had always sided with Malenkov while he had the inside track with the army. When Bulganin showed signs of shifting his allegiance to Khrushchev, it was the tip-off that the Communist Party boss had overcome Malenkov's influence with the army.

Of course, Malenkov recognized he had been caught in a squeeze play long before he submitted his humiliating resignation, full of self-confessions. For months Khrushchev had been overruling Malenkov's policies. Most obviously was Khrushchev's public speech, giving heavy industry priority over consumer goods, thus completely reversing Malenkov's consumer-goods policy of August, 1953.

Only mystery is how Malenkov has managed to retain his head on his shoulders, since the custom in Red Russia is to murder defeated politicians. Best guess is that the Kremlin figured it would look bad, both at home and abroad, to accuse another top official of treason. Malenkov has cause, however, to worry about his health. It will surprise no one if he comes down suddenly with, say, a heart attack.

As for the new Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, United States experts agree that he is merely a figurehead. Most likely Khrushchev gave him the premiership to placate the Red army. How long Bulganin will last in his new seat, however, is subject to speculation.

## Capital Chaff

When Amvets National Commander Rufus Wilson learned

that President Eisenhower likes French cuffs on his shirts, he recently gave him a hand some set of gold cuff links embossed with the presidential seal. . . . Congressman Sid Her long of Florida, chief talent scout for the House Democrats' baseball team, reported that he is "much impressed" by the throwing arm of Peter Rodino, 3d, 3-year-old son of the New ark, N. J., solon during a "try out" on the Capitol steps. "We can use him about 1985," the Congressman reportedly told

the Congressman from New Jersey. . . . Ike is determined to make absentee voting easier for servicemen in 1956. He has asked Commander of Amvets Wilson to lead a national campaign to simplify absentee local voting laws and ballots for servicemen. (Two states, Pennsylvania and New Mexico, do not permit absentee ballots.)

(Copyright, 1954, Ben Bradlee, Inc.)

Read Drew Pearson's column every day, including Sunday, in The Washington Post and Times-Herald.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 CUC/Bew  
ON 9/4/94 C.A. #89-1826

Classified by SP4 CUC/Bew  
Declassify on: OADR 12/14/89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Washington Post and Times-Herald  
February 12, 1955

ENCLOSURE  
62-80750-2511  
GROUP 1  
Excluded

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-13-98 BY SP 2 ALM/ELH  
Per DGA  
Classified Material Enclosed

ENCLOSURE

62 - 9 0750 25/3

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 2-9-55

FROM : Liaison Representative,  
HeidelbergSUBJECT: ~~INTELLIGENCE GLOSSARY,~~  
~~GERMAN-ENGLISH~~

b3

Referral/Consult

As of possible use to the Espionage and Cryptographic  
Sections, there are attached two copies of [REDACTED]Encl. (2)  
GAV:  
(3)

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Central Intelligence Agency

1 copy retained  
Room 1539 J22

R-6

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Per OGA

RECORDED - 19

62-80750-2514

INDEXED

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FEB 18

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FBI  
CENTRAL RESEARCH SECTION

67 MAR 4 1955

GZI-125

CENTRAL RESEARCH

Unclassified Material Enclosed

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DATE 4-13-98 BY SP2ALM/EHL  
Per OGA

ENCLOSURE TO BUREAU FROM

Two copies of

b3  
Referral/Consult

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE:

February 21, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
SURVEY OF CIA BY GENERAL MARK W. CLARK

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SYNOPSIS:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-27-92 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Per OGA

General Mark Clark was orally briefed on February 18, 1955, concerning Alfred Kohlberg, well known "China Lobby" personality. Clark was informed that briefing was given on a strictly confidential basis and that Bureau could not advise him as to whether or not he should add his name to list of sponsors led by Kohlberg. After listening to Agent, Clark stated that he was dubious about making his name available to Kohlberg. He expressed his appreciation for assistance given by Bureau. Clark then stated that he was interested in meeting with the Director and indicated that immediate members of his staff would be included if such a meeting took place. With regard to staff, he had reference to Captain Eddie Rickenbacker; Admiral Richard Lansing Conolly, U. S. Navy retired and now President of Long Island University; Donald Stuart Russell, President of the University of South Carolina; and Ernest Frederick Hollings. The Bureau's files do not contain any derogatory information concerning Rickenbacker, Conolly and Hollings. Russell, while Special Assistant to James F. Byrnes in State Department, was supervisor of Alger Hiss. One source was very critical of Russell's attitude toward security matters. General Clark stated that in about two weeks he would request an appointment with Director; he changed his mind about other members of his staff being present. General Clark confided that he has received many complaints about CIA operations and that at present time he is in the "midst of a mass confusion." Clark has personal impression that there is a clique in State Department and CIA composed of "fuzzy heads" and "cream puffs" who are responsible for policy going into and out of National Security Council. Clark inquired about security within CIA. His attention was directed to the fact there is much that the Bureau does not know about CIA employees and interworkings of Agency. He was informed our employment standards differed from those of CIA.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-88575-1

62-88575-1

62-88575-1

SJP:fjb  
(6)

INDEXED - 28

RECORDED - 28

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Papich

62-80750-2517

1 - Mr. Holloman  
24 MAR 7 1955 Liaison Section

71 MAY 13 1955

Liaison

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

ACTION:

A brief is being prepared by the Liaison Section for the Director's assistance in the event that a meeting takes place between him and General Clark. If and when the request is received from General Clark, it will be transmitted through the Liaison Agent. Agent Papich is taking steps to ascertain the identities of CIA officials who might be mentioned by General Clark if and when he confers with the Director.

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated February 16, 1955, wherein the Director approved that General Mark Clark be furnished an oral briefing on a strictly confidential basis concerning Alfred Kohlberg, the "China Lobby" personality. You will recall that General Clark had been approached by Kohlberg to include the General's name to a list of sponsors who are promoting a foreign policy advocated by Kohlberg and associates.

On February 18, 1955, Agent Papich contacted General Clark and gave him an oral briefing concerning Alfred Kohlberg. This briefing was based entirely on the attachment to the memorandum of February 16, 1955. That attachment consisted of a review of the main file of Kohlberg.

Agent Papich made it very clear to General Clark that this information was furnished to him on a strictly confidential basis. It was also emphasized to the General that the Bureau was in no position to advise him whether or not he



Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

should furnish his name to Kohlberg and that was a decision which he personally had to make. After listening to the Agent, General Clark stated that although the list of sponsors included many prominent Americans, he was very dubious about making his name available to Kohlberg. He stated that he was deeply appreciative for the assistance given to him by the Bureau in connection with this matter. He asked that this appreciation be called to the attention of the Director.

General Clark then stated that he had reached a stage in his survey of the CIA operations where it had become most necessary for him to confer with the Director. He stated that if possible he would like to include other members of his immediate staff if and when he talked to Mr. Hoover. With regard to his immediate staff, he had reference to Captain Eddie Rickenbacker; Admiral Richard Lansing Conolly, U. S. Navy retired and now President of Long Island University; Donald Stuart Russell, President of the University of South Carolina; and Ernest Frederick Hollings. The Bureau's files do not contain any derogatory information concerning Rickenbacker, Conolly and Hollings. With regard to Russell, it should be noted that he was a Special Assistant to James F. Byrnes when the latter was Secretary of State. While in this capacity, Alger Hiss was under Russell's supervision. One source described Russell as a "politician, fence-sitter, and wishy-washy" concerning security matters.

With this information in mind, the Liaison Agent felt it was advisable to avoid a meeting between the General, his staff and the Director. Agent Papich offered the personal suggestion to General Clark that he might find it more advisable to request that he alone meet with Mr. Hoover. General Clark immediately accepted this and stated that through his Washington office he would contact the Liaison Agent in about two weeks with the request for an appointment with Mr. Hoover. He added that if and when he talked to the Director, he personally might ask that Mr. Hoover later meet with other members of his immediate staff, namely the individuals mentioned above. He stated that he would be interested in doing this primarily to make certain that individuals such as Captain Eddie Rickenbacker would be happy in that they had the opportunity to meet with J. Edgar Hoover.

In order to obtain some idea regarding the nature of the questions which General Clark was interested in asking

QD

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

of the Director, Agent Papich asked General Clark what he had in mind. The General stated "I am now talking on a very strictly confidential basis." He advised that he and his staff had conferred with many Government officials concerning CIA operations and that many complaints had been received. He stated that he had also received comments in support of the Agency and that at the present time he was in the "midst of a mass of confusion." He then commented that he personally was receiving the impression that there was a clique in CIA and in the State Department composed of "fuzzy heads" and "cream puffs" who were responsible for the formulation of much policy which moved in and out of the National Security Council. General Clark questioned the judgment of such individuals. He stated that if and when he talked to Mr. Hoover, he might have some names of individuals in CIA regarding whom he would like to have Mr. Hoover's observations. Agent Papich then explained to the General that he should bear in mind that the Bureau has investigated some people who are connected with CIA and there actually are thousands of CIA employees who have never been subjected to FBI investigation. It was pointed out to him that there is much that the Bureau does not know about many CIA officials and there is a lot that we do not know about the interworkings of the Agency. Agent Papich informed General Clark that he was making the above comments in order that the General could appreciate that the Director might not be in a position to give him any assistance concerning certain individuals in CIA.

General Clark then asked the Liaison Agent how the Bureau felt about security in CIA. It was again pointed out to General Clark that there was much that the Bureau did not know about the internal structure and workings of the Agency. General Clark was informed that it has been our personal experience that our employment standards differed from those followed by CIA.

b3

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from Mr. Roach

General Clark volunteered that when he was given the responsibility of surveying CIA operations, he was asked not to duplicate the work of General James Doolittle, who had completed a survey of CIA's covert operations in October, 1954. General Clark stated that he disagreed with the foregoing and he took the stand that although he respected General Doolittle's work, it was necessary for him and his staff to conduct a complete study even if it involved some duplication of the work done by General Doolittle.

Agent Papich received the definite impression from General Clark that the Bureau rates very highly with him and that the survey conducted by Clark and his staff apparently has not involved us in any derogatory fashion.

gms  
DR  
js

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nichols

DATE: February 25,

1955

FROM : H. A. Jones

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-15-98 BY SP8 CAJ/IEHL  
Per OGA

b3  
b7D

SUBJECT:

— INFORMANT  
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

By reference from the Director's Office at 12:30 P.M. today,  
SA Melvin L. Long spoke telephonically with [redacted]

[redacted], who at first declined  
to identify himself but later did so, requesting that his identity be kept  
confidential.

b3  
b7D

[redacted] He was bringing this to the Bureau's  
attention because he wanted us to advise him as to whether or not his  
suspicions are based on fact. He was advised that we could not inform  
him in this regard because of the confidential nature of Bufiles, and  
he was thanked for giving us this information. It appears that appro-  
priate dissemination of this allegation will have to be made.

Search slips attached.

MLL:jbg

(2) 53 MAR 11 1955  
Attachment 249

NOT RECORDED  
102 MAR 7 1955

b3  
b7D  
29 MAR 4 1955  
EMP. SEC. SECT.

Memorandum to Mr. Nichols

February 25, 1955

RECOMMENDATION:

That this matter be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for appropriate dissemination.

*[Handwritten signature]*

3/1/55

INFO GIVEN TO

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*[Handwritten signature]*

b3  
b7D

~~SECRET~~  
~~AIR COUNSEL~~

Date: February 23, 1955  
To: Legal Attache  
Tokyo, Japan  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Subject: SOURCES OF INFORMATION UTILIZED IN  
JAPAN BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
G-2, AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-27-82 BY SP-6 HUL/HL  
RCS OGA

For your information [redacted]  
whose reliability is not known, recently furnished the  
following information to the New York Office of the Bureau.  
[redacted] requested his name be held in strictest confidence  
and not furnished to any other Government agency.

b7D

[redacted] alleged that the sources utilized in Japan  
by Central Intelligence Agency, G-2 and State Security of the  
Department of State are "salted;" that is they are planted with  
these agencies by the Communists in Japan. [redacted] further  
alleged that as soon as any of these agencies contact any of  
their sources in Japan concerning any particular information,  
the Communists become aware of it. He expressed his belief  
that these sources only furnish the agencies enough information  
to enable these sources to continue as sources of the agencies.

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted] further related that [redacted]  
information concerning Communist activities in Japan. He  
explained his reason for so doing was to do what he can to

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc: (64) Foreign Service, Desk  
Cover Memo to LEGAT Rosen from Mr. Stanley dated 2/23/55  
WLW:ba [redacted]  
(5) 28 FEB 28

NOT RECORDED  
2148 MAR 25 1955

COMM-FBI

62-77962

57 MAR 29 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-77962-8

keep the Communists from taking over Japan [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he has a source, whom he described as reliable [redacted] who furnished him information. He said that this source receives information from [redacted]

[redacted] reluctantly identified his source [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] also very reluctantly identified the individual who furnishes [redacted] information as [redacted] not further identified. [redacted] further stated that [redacted] will not talk with anyone unless the individual is vouched for by [redacted]

The general allegation made by [redacted] regarding the sources utilized by Central Intelligence Agency, G-2, and [redacted] has been furnished to the headquarters of those agencies by the Liaison Section of the Bureau. However, neither [redacted] identity nor the identities of his sources have been furnished to these agencies.

b7D

The above is being furnished for your information and guidance and no active inquiries are being requested of you at the present time. However, you should be alert to furnish the Bureau any information coming to your attention relating to this matter.

SAC, New York

March 2, 1955

Director, FBI

62-80750-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5-27-98 BY SP2 ALM/ELC  
Per OGA

SOURCES OF INFORMATION UTILIZED ABROAD  
BY CIA, G-2, AND STATE SECURITY  
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING  
(EMPLOYEES SECURITY SECTION)

Referral/Consult

Reurlet February 15, 1955, entitled

b7D

Your referenced letter included information to the effect [redacted] who requested his name be held in strictest confidence and not furnished any other Government agency, advised that the sources utilized by CIA, CIC, G-2, and State Security in Japan are "salted"; that is, they are planted with these agencies by the Communists in Japan. He further claimed that as soon as any of these agencies contacted their sources in Japan concerning particular information, the Communists would be aware of it. In addition [redacted] expressed the belief that these sources only furnish U. S. intelligence agents in Japan enough information to enable them to continue as sources of the U. S. agencies.

b7D

The above allegation with respect to the reliability of the sources utilized by these agencies in Japan was brought to the attention of appropriate representatives of the headquarters of these agencies in Washington through Bureau Liaison. [redacted] identity was not disclosed and the representatives of the agencies were advised that the reliability of the individual making this allegation is unknown and the information was being passed on to them for whatever action they deem appropriate.

ORIGINAL FILED IN


CIA has now advised through Liaison that it deems this allegation most serious and it desires additional specific details concerning the allegation. It further desires that the allegation and specific details regarding it be furnished CIA in writing. G-2 has made a similar request as CIA with respect to this allegation and has asked that specific cases be cited.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Two experienced agents should immediately recontact [redacted] to obtain all details in [redacted] possession to support his allegation. An attempt should be made to obtain this information from [redacted] in a signed statement and his permission obtained for the Bureau to disseminate the statement to the appropriate agencies concerned.

b7D

cc: [redacted]  
WLM:hjc  
(5)



b7D

Cover memo from Stanley to Rosen, same date, same caption. WLM:hjc

57 MAR 30 1955



For your information, if [ ] furnishes the signed statement but stipulates that his identity cannot be disclosed outside the Bureau, the Bureau contemplates furnishing a copy of the statement to the appropriate agencies with [ ] name deleted therefrom.

b7D

This matter must be given immediate attention and your reply reach the Bureau as soon as possible. If [ ] is unavailable for immediate contact or for any other reason there will be a delay in your reply, the Bureau should be immediately advised of the contemplated time the reply will reach the Bureau.

The contact with [ ] must be handled in a very careful manner in order to insure no justifiable criticism results from the contact with [ ]

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen

DATE: March 2, 1955

FROM : Mr. C. H. Stanley *as*

SUBJECT: SOURCES OF INFORMATION UTILIZED ABROAD  
BY CIA, G-2, AND STATE SECURITY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b7D

The attached memorandum from Stanley to Mr. Rosen dated February 23, 1955, reflects that an allegation made by [redacted] whose reliability is unknown and who requested his name be held in strictest confidence and not furnished any other Government agency, to the effect that sources utilized by CIA, G-2, and State Security in Japan are unreliable and planted with these agencies by the Communists, was brought to the attention of appropriate officials of these agencies for whatever action they deem appropriate.

Notations appearing on the attached memorandum reflect that Colonel Perry and Colonel Pope of G-2 desire further specific information citing cases involved and, further, that G-2 would prefer the information in writing. In addition, CIA desires additional specific details and would like to have the information in writing as CIA considers the allegation most serious.

Referral/Consult  
b7D

## Attachments

cc: A. H. Belmont, Room 1742  
R. E. Rosen, Room 7641

b7D

MLN:bjc *bjc*  
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-15-98 BY SP2 ALM/ETH

Per OGA

20 MAR 4 1955

NOT RECORDED  
45 MAR 8 1955

EMP. SEC. SEC.

b7D

RECOMMENDATION:

Even though it is believed [redacted] will decline to put in writing his allegation regarding the unreliability of the sources of CIA, G-2, and State Security in Japan and, further, that he will decline or be unable to furnish specifics regarding this allegation, in view of the specific request made by G-2 and CIA, it is recommended the attached letter be sent New York instructing it contact [redacted] for the purposes stated.

*Ramm*  
*for* *includ*